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rdinary understandings of authenticity associate being authentic with being 
true to who one is. Attempts to understand what is meant by this are often 
accompanied by further trope-like clarifications, taking authenticity to entail 
being who you really want to be or being a genuine and unique version of yourself. 
For Bernard Williams (Quoted in Guignon, 2004), “authenticity is… the idea that some 
things are in some real sense you, and others aren’t”. Apart from thinking of 
authenticity as being true to who one is, there is also a general sense in which we 
consider authenticity to be a good thing and something to aspire towards.  On closer 
philosophical inspection, these ordinary understandings of authenticity seem to raise 
further questions due to their vagueness and vacuousness- signifying the opaque 
nature of authenticity as a philosophical concept. These understandings raise 
questions such as: “What is the self that one is being true to?” and “What does being 
true to this self entail?”. Furthermore, in generally taking authenticity to be a good 
thing or something to aspire towards, we need to account for what it is about 
authenticity that makes it good. Finding adequate explanations that can account for 
these questions mentioned above belies provision of a tenable philosophical account 
of authenticity.  
 
It is my interest in demystifying our vague ordinary use of the notion of authenticity 
that makes it an interesting philosophical concept to focus my conceptual analysis 
on. In this dissertation, I engage in a conceptual analysis of what authenticity is with 
the hopes of illuminating a satisfactory and substantive philosophical account of what 
it means for one to be true to who one is. To provide a conceptual account that can 
O 
adequately match our considered judgments about authenticity, I also hope that my 
project will be one that achieves reflective equilibrium regarding the notion of 
authenticity. By reflective equilibrium, I refer to the methodological approach to 
philosophical inquiry that has been canonized as a result of John Rawls’ (1971) work 
in developing his theory of justice (see A Theory of Justice, 1971). Reflective 
equilibrium entails finding a state of balance or coherence between our ordinary 
understandings of what something is (i.e., a moral concept) and the theoretical 
account used to explain what that concept is (Rawls, 1971:18-22). Achieving 
reflective equilibrium may require that we change the theory to accommodate 
ordinary judgments or modify or reject some of the considered judgments about a 
concept to preserve the tenability of the theory. Taking this into consideration, my 
conceptual analysis of authenticity is primarily interested in achieving reflective 
equilibrium in this sense. My main focus will be to find coherence between the 
abovementioned ordinary understandings of authenticity and provide a theoretical 
understanding of authenticity. I will be developing my own theoretical conception of 
authenticity. I hope that by the end of this project, I would have provided a satisfactory 
answer to the question, “What does it mean for one to be true to who one is and for 
this to be a good thing?”  
 
Two main considered judgments will be driving my conceptual analysis of 
authenticity. First, our understanding of being authentic as “being true to who you 
uniquely are”. Secondly, our considered judgment of authenticity as an ethical ideal 
that all persons are capable of attaining in the middle of living their lives. It is in this 
sense that my project has two inquiries laden in it: one being concerned with what 
we mean by being true to yourself and the other being interested in unpacking 
authenticity as an ethical ideal. The first one relates to providing tenable answers to 
the following questions: “What does being true to oneself entail?” and “what is it that 
one is being true to when one is considered to be authentic?”. The second line of 
inquiry is interested in providing an answer to the questions, “why is it that authenticity 
is thought of as a good thing that we should all aspire to?”. Should my philosophical 
account of authenticity be able to achieve reflective equilibrium concerning these two 
main lines of inquiry, I would have provided a tenable and competitive account of 
authenticity that has intuitive appeal and stays true to why we employ the term in our 
society.  
 
In the first chapter, I will be doing some ground clearing in establishing our ordinary 
understandings of authenticity. Here, I will be primarily interested in showing the initial 
tenability of our considered judgments about authenticity. In a project of reflective 
equilibrium, as Catherine Elgin (1996:102) notes, we must ensure that the theory or 
concept developed about a particular considered judgment is robust. The only way 
to do so, Elgin (1996:102) argues, is to make sure we make use of generally initially 
credible considered judgments.  In this concise chapter, I will show how our 
considered judgment of authenticity as “being true to who one is” is an initially tenable 
idea. I will illustrate this by exploring our intuitions using a scenario that can help us 
explore what being authentic entails. Proceeding from this chapter, I move to develop 
a conception of authenticity as being true to who one is. To do so in a manner that 
achieves reflective equilibrium, I will methodically provide an answer to what 
authenticity is by providing accounts for what it is that one is being true to, what it is 
to be true to oneself, and what it is that makes being authentic good.  
 
In the second chapter, I will begin to conceptualize the first puzzle of an adequate 
conception of authenticity. Here, I will start by providing an account of the self that 
one is being true to when one is authentic. I begin by looking at Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
(1981) narrative unity of a human life as a viable starting point in understanding the 
self that we are being true to when we are being authentic. MacIntyre, in After Virtue, 
seeks to provide a conception of a unified human life as a way to build an 
understanding of virtue that is non-arbitrary and adequate when we come to judge 
individuals as being virtuous persons.  However, as I will show in the third chapter, 
MacIntyre’s narrative conception of the self is not without its issues. MacIntyre is 
considerably ambiguous with regards to the nature of the unity of the self in question; 
issues mainly brought about by the temporality of the self. Attempts to conceive of 
the self as a unified whole seem to be at odds with the fact that a significant part of 
who we are is laden in the future - a part of our lives that we have not yet lived. The 
narrative conception of the self runs into the following problem: how can we conceive 
of the self as a story of an entire life when a part of one’s life is not yet lived? 
 
Bernard Williams (2007) in Life as Narrative raises two main charges of scepticism 
that directly relate to this problem, with the first one noting the potential redundancy 
of a narrative unity of self and the second noting the impossibility of conceiving of a 
unified self in the first place. The first charge of scepticism is raised due to Williams’ 
belief that adding a narrative to the full explanatory tale of a human life may be 
unnecessary if the explanatory tale gives us adequate information about who the 
person is. The second charge of scepticism, which I take to mainly come as a result 
of MacIntyre’s ambiguity on the nature of the unified self, comes about because of 
the impossibility of conceiving one’s life as an actual whole when one is in the midst 
of living it.  Macintyre’s motivations for positing a unified self are to provide an 
adequate and non-arbitrary conception of the virtues. Williams, if he’s right in his 
scepticism, may be able to show that we cannot make use of a narrative unity of self 
to shed light on what it is for one to be moral now. Noting that I aim to use the narrative 
unity of self as that which we refer to when we speak about authentic selves, we can 
see how these doubts could easily be extended to authenticity. This is given by the 
concern that the narrative unity of self has the potential to fail in explaining what it is 
for someone to be who they truly are now.  
 
However, there is a strong sense in which our ordinary understandings of authenticity 
take it to be a state which one can attain in the middle of living one’s life. The idea 
that we can be authentic amid and throughout our lives is a notion I want to preserve 
in my conception of authenticity. It is for these reasons I propose, in the fourth chapter 
of this dissertation, a modified version of MacIntyre’s narrative unity of the self. I term 
this modified conception of self the Extrapolated Narrative Unity of Self (ENUS) and 
take it to be the best way to conceive of the self that one is being true to when one is 
authentic. In short, the Extrapolated Narrative Unity of Self encompasses the story of 
who one is. This story, I take it, comprises of the factually supported historical 
narrative of all that one is, and all that one can possibly take themselves to be. The 
Extrapolated Narrative Unity of Self will be taken as the self which I take it one is being 
true to when one is authentic. My view of the self borrows from Aristotelianism in that 
it considers the projected future self to be a function of one’s chosen telos- the ethical 
goal of a good life that one pursues as one’s life purpose or ultimate aim at present.  
 
I am of the view that this Extrapolated Narrative Unity of Self is the missing component 
to a robust conception of authenticity, due to its peculiar temporal nature. As I will 
show, the temporal nature of the Extrapolated Narrative Unity of Self contrasts and 
provides an alternative to the intuitive thought of a unified self as a unity of one’s past, 
present, and actual future- something Williams raises as impossible when one is in 
the middle of living their life. In further ratifying the tenability of conceiving of the self 
as a narrative unity in this new sense I have suggested, I will also appeal to Ricoeur's 
(1995) notion of narrative configuration to further show how it is that one’s life can 
come to be understood as a coherent whole. I will also be looking to Charles Taylor’s 
(1989) notion of “taking a stance in inescapable moral frameworks”, where a unity of 
self can be said to be brought in place by the human desire to live a meaningful life. 
I will also look to Somogy Varga’s (2011) notion of alternativelessness. It is in robustly 
shaping my conception of the Extrapolated Narrative Unity of Self through appealing 
to these ways of further thinking about the unity of self that I hope to provide a strong 
understanding of the self that one is being true to.  
 
In the fourth chapter, I will move to address the question of what being true to oneself 
entails, given that one’s self is to be understood as the Extrapolated Narrative Unity 
of Self. I will show that being true to who one is involves effort and activity geared at 
the composition, expression, and maintenance of the story of oneself. Furthermore, 
the story of one’s self that serves as the content of the Extrapolated Narrative Unity of 
Self must necessarily be an accurate representation of the explanatory tale of one’s 
life as one has lived it. In short, I will discuss efforts of assuring accuracy and 
asserting oneself as irrevocable to some of the efforts I take to constitute being true 
to who one is. In the fifth and final chapter of this thesis, I turn my attention towards 
explaining why we ordinarily think of authenticity as being a good thing. Here, I 
defend the claim that we generally associate authenticity with goodness because of 
its links with other things we ordinarily take to be good. Firstly, I take it that authenticity 
is usually taken to be good because we see it to require and reinforce a virtuous life. 
Secondly, I argue that we take authenticity to be good because of how it is 
inextricably linked to living a Eudaimonic life. As it will be evident, I limit the 
ambitiousness of accounting for the goodness in authenticity. Due to the scope of 
this dissertation, the main aim will only be to account for the goodness of authenticity 
by showing how it is significantly related to goodness. This aims at providing new 
avenues for conceptualizing a better philosophical understanding of why it is that we 







































On Our Ordinary Understandings of Authenticity 
 
n order to present a conception of authenticity that can succeed in achieving 
reflective equilibrium, preliminarily establishing the well-founded nature of our 
considered judgments about authenticity should not be taken for granted. It is 
important that the considered judgments which initiate a project of reflective 
equilibrium are themselves initially adequately defensible and can be used as a 
reasonable basis for a conceptual analysis of authenticity. Catherine Elgin (1996), in 
The Merits of Equilibrium, outlines the key conditions that a considered judgment 
needs to meet in order to be used as the initiating point of a philosophical enquiry 
seeking to achieve reflective equilibrium. Elgin (1996:102-5) tells us that a considered 
judgment needs to be “initially tenable”.  I will start this chapter by expounding on 
this condition set out by Elgin. Thereafter, I will provide a working scenario example 
I 
that I will use to test our considered judgments about authenticity throughout this 
paper consistently. Making reference to the intuitions emergent from the working 
scenario, I will then proceed to do some ground clearing on our ordinary 
understandings of authenticity with the hopes of establishing an initially tenable and 
coherent set of related considered judgments that will be used in chapter 2 for the 
proceeding conceptual analysis of authenticity.  
 
According to Elgin (1996:102-5), a considered judgment is considered initially 
tenable within the context of the project of achieving reflective equilibrium when it (i) 
is generally accepted as preliminarily credible by those who make use of the concept 
it refers to, (ii) has preliminary consonance with other considered judgments that are 
already held and closely related to it, and (iii) is relevant to the other considered 
judgments we already accept.1 In terms of authenticity, the considered judgments 
about authenticity mustn't curtail our extensive efforts to be authentic. Simply put, 
whatever we ordinarily belief authenticity to be must be generally seen to result in 
being authentic, should one take the effort to act on what one believes authenticity is. 
The condition of the general acceptance of a considered judgment as initially 
credible is not sufficient, by itself, in establishing initial tenability. It is likely that the 
general acceptance of a considered judgment as initially credible may be predicated 
in significant bias, prejudice, or common errors held about the concept or idea that 
 
1 The initial credibility of a considered judgment is said to be established when it is generally 
accepted that our belief (considered judgment) of what something is does not curtail the 
actions or outcomes for which that belief is intended. While some of these errors and 
prejudices can be weeded out in the process of achieving reflective equilibrium between 
considered judgments and a theory of a concept, I take it that significant errors can also be 
identified and addressed at the level of the considered judgments themselves. Striving for 
consistency between closely related considered judgments can be a way of reinforcing the 
considered judgment as a tenable understanding of what it is that it refers to. It is this that we 
speak of when concerned about achieving consonance between a considered judgment and 
other already accepted considered judgments which are closely related to it. The final 
condition required to establish the initial tenability of a considered judgment is that it be 
relevant to the other considered judgments that we hold about that concept. In 
supplementing the consonance of the considered judgment, we want the related consonant 
considered judgments to be in a symbiotic network where the individual judgments are made 
more tenable due to their place in this network of considered judgments. For a more detailed 
explanation of how the initial credibility of a considered judgment is established, see Elgin, 
C. 1996. The Merits of Equilibrium. In Considered Judgment. New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press. 101-145. 
 
the considered judgments refer to (Elgin, 1996:102). For establishing the initial 
tenability of our considered judgments about what authenticity is, it must be shown 
that our considered judgments about authenticity are in initial harmony with 
themselves and the ideas closely related to authenticity like truthfulness or 
uniqueness.  
 
Preserving the tenability of what a concept is ordinarily understood to be as a whole, 
requires that we sometimes secede or annex certain considered judgments about 
what something is or those that relate to what that thing is. (Elgin, 1996: 103).  
Regarding our considered judgments about authenticity, it is imperative that each of 
the considered judgments systematically serve our holistic general understanding of 
what authenticity is. Having explained the three conditions required for a considered 
judgment to be generally initially tenable, I now proceed to present the working 
scenario that will be used to interrogate and test our intuitions on authenticity in the 
rest of this dissertation.  
 
Consider the scenario of a twenty-five-year-old man named Themba. Themba is 
currently in an internal battle with the acceptance of his sexuality as a gay man. We 
can understand why: He comes from a Christian conservative and Xhosa traditional 
background, one still rampant with homophobia and conservatively patriarchal 
expectations. Throughout his entire life and within his spheres of influence, he 
frequently had his “manhood” questioned by his counterparts. This continued 
throughout his years of adulthood-  where he was continually being pestered to find 
a wife in order to be a “proper man”. In many ways, hearing his kinfolk engage in 
homophobic talk, he considers being gay as something that is not an option for him- 
both internally and expressively. As a result, he suppresses his sexuality, both to 
himself and others. To convince himself and others that he is not gay, he often 
overcompensates his masculinity and performs heterosexuality. He does so to a point 
where he continually makes an effort to convince himself and believe that he is 
heterosexual. This is something that he finds himself continuously having to do, 
particularly due to his homosexual proclivities being ever-present and pervasive in 
him.  
 
As a result, Themba lives more of his life being preoccupied with his fear of being 
seen as being gay. That is, his motivations for asserting himself to himself and others 
as heterosexual are often founded in exogenous reasons associated with negative 
depictions of homosexuality in his community. He constantly obsesses over the social 
costs associated with being gay and yearns to be “normal”. In his thoughts, Themba 
can be understood as martyring who he actually is in order to maintain acceptability 
from others in his community, as well as lives as an individual who  aims to continue 
enjoying the net socially beneficial existence that heterosexual people do. All these 
considerations, so to speak, leave Themba in a place where he has brainwashed 
himself to believing that he is heterosexual, when he is actually gay.  
 
In assessing the abovementioned scenario, our intuitions should immediately tell us 
that we are experiencing a tragic case of inauthenticity. This is marked by a few 
considerations that may relate to our considered judgments about authenticity. At 
first, we can say that Themba is not being true to who he is. Here, we see that the 
notion of authenticity is closely related to our conceptions of being truthful and is 
incompatible with forms of deception or misrepresentation of self. The intuition that 
he is not being true to himself is given largely by the fact that Themba is choosing to 
suppress an aspect of who he is in order to maintain social capital in his community. 
Put differently, in Themba choosing to deceive himself and others into believing that 
he is heterosexual, and hence suppressing his actual sexuality as a gay man, he is 
failing to be true to himself. His self-deceptive idea of himself as heterosexual can 
actually be seen as curtailing his efforts to be who he really is- something we see as 
important to being authentic as well. 
 
Themba can also be considered to not be who he truly is, privy to the motivations 
behind why he decides to understand himself and present himself as heterosexual. 
There is a sense here that there is a fraudulent self and an actual self that are present. 
The fraudulent self is that which is primarily constructed by exogenous considerations 
like him essentially seeking approval and acceptance from others. Here, because his 
heterosexuality is not self-originating in the right sense, it would be significantly 
suspect to consider his heterosexuality as a reflection of who he is. He is actively 
disregarding who he actually is, which goes against our ordinary conceptions of 
authenticity. Asserting heterosexuality as a means of rejecting his homosexuality, and 
not being heterosexual simpliciter, significantly undermines the claims that Themba 
is being himself. This further ratifies intuitions that he is being inauthentic.  
 
The one intuition I seek to problematize is the association of being authentic with 
being whoever one wants to be. At the level of our considered judgments about 
authenticity, some might hold the view that Themba is being who he wants to be by 
choosing to “be” heterosexual. It is genuinely the case that Themba doesn’t “want” 
to be homosexual either. It is an identity which he believes he has pragmatic reasons 
to reject. He doesn’t want to live a life where he is persecuted or be ousted by his 
community and loved ones. We can see how some might say that he is being who he 
wants to be by choosing to be who he is not. Here, we might want to put preliminary 
qualifications to the notion of being who you want to be, as it relates to authenticity. 
Intuitively, when speaking of the nexus between being who you want to be and being 
who one is, we commonly conceive being who you want to be to be a desire that is 
intrinsically motivated within the context of authenticity. Intuitively, it is also well-
founded to believe that someone is authentic when who they are, so to speak, is 
properly self-originating.  Now, formulating who you are on the premise of avoiding 
how others may perceive you or what they may do to you does not seem to be 
adequately self-originating in the desired manner. Here, we could simply understand 
Themba as primarily wanting to be who others want him to be- an idea which is at 
odds with being authentic. This is further ratified, in the first instance, by how the 
motivations for being who others want him to be are laden in fears of what would 
happen to him if he were to be who he actually is. To take who one truly is to be 
compatible with the intuition that one is being who one really wants to be, it seems 
that we must construe who he really wants to be as something that is properly self-
originating.  
 
Finally, we can seemingly take Themba to be living an impoverished existence as a 
result of the suppression of his homosexuality. He is somewhat robbing himself of 
living a full and fulfilling life by living a life governed by fear and sacrificing who he 
really is for the acceptance of others. Side-stepping and suppressing who he is takes 
away from his flourishing qua who he actually is. Despite the potential contention 
regarding whether it is bad that he is pretending to be something he is not, we can 
reasonably agree that Themba pretending to be a heterosexual is bad for him. In one 
sense, the life Themba lives is one of constant anxiety which stops him from living 
how he would otherwise live if conditions were more favourable to him. So, in this 
sense, it seems that we can acknowledge that under different circumstances, 
Themba would be able to conceive of being gay as an overall better way to live. This 
would mean that we can conceive of the fact that, ceteris paribus, he is not living a 
life that is the most fulfilling for him. This indicates that Themba lives a life that is bad 
for him or a worse life in an important way as a result of him pretending to be 
heterosexual.    
 
In the above exploration of intuitions about authenticity, we see that there is an initially 
tenable understanding of authenticity that emerges. Firstly, the key initially tenable 
understanding of authenticity is that it involves being true to who you are. What this 
is said to involve is the idea that there is a sense in which there is a self that is an 
actual reflection of who you are. This is particularly given by our exploration of the 
intuition that there is a fraudulent self and a real self in the case where Themba asserts 
himself as a heterosexual man. As such, taking this intuition to be generally accepted 
as credible, we take it to be a key intuition that needs to be explained by a theoretical 
account of authenticity that aims at achieving reflective equilibrium. Expounding this 
real or true self will be a challenge that my conceptual analysis will have to meet. A 
theoretical account of authenticity would also need to adequately explain how in 
being true to who he is, he is being who he really wants to be and who he really is. 
Finally, we also need to explain the strong intuition of how Themba’s being inauthentic 
is essentially bad for him. Conversely, a theory of authenticity seeking to achieve 
reflective equilibrium would need to explain why being true to himself is something 
that is generally good by explaining why being authentic is good for him.  
 
For now, we can establish that my exploration of the intuitions has established the 
general initial tenability of the considered judgments about authenticity. Largely, I 
strived to make the considerations consonant with each other by refining our 
understanding of what it means for one to be who one wants to be. I have shown how, 
individually, the considered judgments are also generally credible by exploring them 
in terms of the intuitions the scenario brings about. Having shown the initial tenability 
of the considered judgments, I proceed to provide a theoretical conception of 
authenticity which achieves reflective equilibrium with our considered judgments. In 
the second, third and fourth chapters, I focus on the strong ordinary understanding 
of authenticity as being true to who you are. Mainly, I focus on expounding what being 
true to oneself is by exploring these two questions: “What is the self that one is being 










































The Self One Is True To: MacIntyre’s Narrative 
Unity of Self 
 
s I have shown at the end of the first chapter, thinking about authenticity as 
being true to oneself raises two challenges that a philosophical account of 
authenticity must account for. First, there is the problem of providing a tenable 
account of the self that one is being true to. The second problematic requires us to 
provide a tenable account of what being true to one’s self entails. I want to use this 
chapter as the raw material on which I will build a tenable understanding of the self 
we consider one to be true to when one is being authentic. In providing this tenable 
account of the self, I want to begin by looking at Alasdair MacIntyre’s narrative unity 
conception of the self as a promising candidate for the self we are true to when we 
are authentic. In After Virtue, MacIntyre (1981:211) develops a conception of the self 
and understanding of a human life by drawing an analogy from the narrativity of the 
lives of literary and dramatic characters. He primarily makes use of an argument from 
analogy to show how it is the case that we can only intelligibly think of human lives, 
A 
and hence the human self, in terms of a narrative unity. In chapter 14 of After Virtue, 
MacIntyre (1981:214) particularly characterises the self as “the unity of a human life 
which is the unity of a narrative quest”. I will dedicate this chapter to explaining the 
plausibility of the self being a narrative unity in the way construed by MacIntyre. To 
do this, I will now proceed to explore the analogy he draws between the human life 
and the lives of fictional characters to show how a human’s self can also be 
understood as a narrative unity.  
 
Barbara Hardy (1968:5) once said that “we dream in narrative, daydream in narrative, 
remember, anticipate, hope… through narrative”. MacIntyre’s project is dedicated to 
establishing the intelligibility of the claim that we interpret everything that we do, our 
behaviours, as well as our own selves in terms of a narrative unity. MacIntyre 
proceeds to establish the tenability of a narrative unity of a human life by first looking 
at two main challenges that may stand in the way of thinking of a self as a unity. The 
first he terms the Social Obstacle to conceiving of the self as a unified whole. The 
Social Obstacle encompasses the claim that we often occupy various discretely 
distinct social roles in our lives, each making different moral demands on the self and 
requiring different modes of behaviour and action from us (MacIntyre, 1981:203). As 
one would say, the very fact that we are often pulled in many directions and required 
to articulate ourselves in a multiplicity of ways puts significant pressure on the 
tenability of understanding a human life as a unity or a coherent whole. Secondly, 
there is the Sartrian inspired Existential Obstacle to understanding the self as a 
unified whole. The Existential Obstacle is slightly different in that it treats the self as 
separate from the roles one occupies in the world. Here, the claim that the self is a 
unified whole is undermined by denying that there are aspects of oneself that would 
need to be made coherent in the first place. Having these obstacles in mind, 
MacIntyre moves to present an alternative conception of the self that treats every 
aspect of who one is as part of a larger whole. Here, he simultaneously moves to 
show why it is justified to think of a human life and self as a unity by showing how this 
conception of the self-overcomes the potential issues of understanding the self as a 
unity. I will now proceed to expound on what MacIntyre takes the narrative unity of 
self to be through exploring the analogies he draws from literary and dramatic fiction.  
 
The first point of analogy that MacIntyre draws is that, just like in literary and dramatic 
fiction, we find ourselves to be characters within our own life stories and the stories 
of others. Consider the lives of the fictional characters in the literary work of Chinua 
Achebe (1958), Things Fall Apart. We have the main character, Okonkwo, who 
purposefully shapes his own life as a negation of his father’s life, Unoka. Unoka, 
thought Okonkwo, was a lazy effeminate drunk who had nothing to his name. 
Okonkwo’s effort to become a virile, rich and hypermasculine warrior as a result of 
the shame he felt from his father also played a significant role in the lives of other 
characters- notably, his son Nwoye. Due to his own experience of hating the 
emasculated life his father lived, Okonkwo turns puts undue pressure on Nwoye to 
be more masculine so that Nwoye does not end up being a failure like Unoka. This, 
in turn, results in Nwoye’s resentment of his father and everything that his father 
represents, including the Igbo tradition itself. Ultimately Nwoye goes as far as to join 
the religion of the colonizers as a final way of severing himself from his father, 
Okonkwo. This short synopsis shows the trajectory that each character’s life takes as 
a result of another character’s own behaviours and actions. By analogy, this paints a 
picture of how we can understand real human lives as interacting in a similar fashion.  
 
Just like a fictional character, MacIntyre argues, who you are and who you become 
is privy to the influences of your sociality and the context you find yourself in. Looking 
at Okonkwo and his family, we act and behave in ways that come to shape our own 
lives as well as the lives of others. In MacIntyre’s (1981:211) own terms, we are 
necessarily not just actors or characters in our own personal dramas, but also play 
the role of co-authors in our own stories and the stories of others. As a way of 
preliminarily addressing the existential obstacle to conceiving of the self as a unity, 
we see that different aspects of who we are can be primary constituents of who we 
are as a whole. The contexts we find ourselves in, the people we interact with, the 
roles we occupy in the stories of others, and our own stories can all come to form part 
of the person we end up being. This is largely because a human person’s life, like a 
fictive character’s life, is marked by suffering or acting in relation to the narratives of 
others and the settings in which one finds oneself (MacIntyre, 1981:211). We 
seemingly exist within a web of interacting narratives, with some narratives being 
nested in others.  
 
We can see how this first line of analogy can be reasonably accepted. One important 
aspect of who we are is that we find ourselves existing in the world as social beings. 
In being brought into the world, we are already someone’s child, someone’s sibling, 
and later on become someone people work with or someone another person is 
married to. In this sense, we see that our lives are primarily intermingled with the lives 
of others. As such, it appears intuitively true that whatever we do and however we 
behave is going to have a bearing, whether direct or indirect, on the lives of other 
individuals. We also take it to be the case that the circumstances which we find 
ourselves in as we formulate our identities can have a significant and often 
deterministic effect on who we take ourselves to be. Our contexts have their own 
histories, their own stories, which come to influence the personal life stories that 
define who we are. If we grow up in the rough part of town and live most of our 
formative years in poverty, the story of the circumstances we grew up in becomes 
the story of the beginning of our lives. This exploration indicates that we can accept 
that human lives are nested narratives in the same way that the lives of fictional 
characters are- with each story having a determinate impact on the unfolding of 
another. However, we need not necessarily say that who we are is wholly determined 
by what others do or how others behave either. We want to reserve the idea that in 
presiding over your own life, you should be the one that is ultimately responsible for 
how your life turns out. As such, we need to make sense of the idea of being a co-
author of one’s own life story without undermining the fact that one ultimately takes 
the first position of authorship and chief editorship of one’s own life story. The same 
insight applies to the role of the settings in which we find ourselves play in determining 
who we are.  
 
While this indicates how we can understand our lives as unfolding narratives that 
come to be influenced by our settings and our sociality, we have not yet fully shown 
how we can understand human life as a narrative unity. To focus more closely on the 
notion of a narrative unity, MacIntyre moves to draw an analogy between the temporal 
nature of a human life with the temporal nature of a fictional character’s life. Here, he 
states his main claim about what the self is. MacIntyre (1981:205) proceeds to 
articulate how, just like we see in the temporal nature of fictional characters, the self 
“is a unity of a narrative that links birth to life to death as a narrative from beginning 
to middle to end.” At first glance, there may be features of a fictional temporality that 
may prove contentious if we were to map them onto our understanding of an actual 
human life as a whole. Firstly, it seems that in the case of fictional characters, their 
life stories, so to speak, are received by readers from the author as already complete. 
The idea of a unity of beginning, middle and end of a fictional character’s story is 
easy to comprehend given that all of who they are and all they will ever be is already 
present in the literary work. However, this is not how we think of a human life. In the 
middle of our lives, we find that we have not yet lived a significant portion of our lives: 
our respective futures. For these reasons, it may seem quite counterintuitive to 
conceive of human life stories as narrative unities of birth, life and death, amid living 
one’s life.  
 
There is perhaps a way in which MacIntyre can attempt to address these contentions. 
Whatever this way is, it has to address the following very key concern. Given that 
fictional characters are not authors of their own stories in the same way that we are, 
we can comprehend a fictional character’s life story as already being available to be 
interpreted as a unity . For the same reason, we cannot conceive of the human life 
story as actually given at any point in time. The pressure point for MacIntyre lies in 
the fact that the wholeness of a narrative requires that it have an “end” that enables 
us to weave one’s narrative into a whole- seemingly needing to account for the 
completeness of one’s life amid one’s living of it. Given the inability of a person to 
experience the actual ending of his life in the midst of living it, the actual end of a 
human life being inaccessible in medias res puts pressure on the tenability of 
conceiving the self as a narrative unity. This is a disanalogy that MacIntyre needs to 
resolve.  
 
To this, MacIntyre simply claims that “stories are lived before they are told- except in 
the case of fiction” (MacIntyre, 1981:212). Here, MacIntyre deals with the different 
aspects of the temporality of a life (the beginning, middle, and end). It also shows 
how they are analogous to the temporal nature of fictional characters found in 
narratives, with the exception that we live our life stories first before we make sense 
of them as a coherent whole. In the case of the narrative history of an individual that 
is also the co-author, character, and executive editor of his own life story, MacIntyre 
takes the notion of the beginning of one’s life story to take dual shape. Firstly, one’s 
beginning is marked by the setting they find themselves in. This can be the 
circumstances in which they are born, the people they find themselves being related 
to when they enter this world, and the roles they find themselves occupying in the 
lives of others as they enter this world. What this captures, according to MacIntyre 
(1981:215), is the fact that “characters… never really start ab initio, they are plunged 
in medias res, the beginning of their story is in some sense already made for them by 
who and what has gone before them. This is a plausible understanding of the 
beginning of a self. When we are born, we find that our personal narratives are already 
nested in a pre-existing plot filled with various characters within a certain context, 
from our family environment to the social climate of the year in which we were born. 
 
The second shape of the beginning of one’s life story takes the form of a recurring 
beginning. This recurring beginning occurs throughout one’s life, given by one’s 
position as a co-author and chief editor of their personal life story. The idea here is 
that if someone were to isolate an episode of your life and ask you “how did this come 
about?”, you should be able to pick out an earlier episode in your history as being 
causally effective in informing your present. It is this second shape of a beginning 
that MacIntyre takes to be important in understanding who we are at every given 
moment of our adult lives. Fictional characters seem to adequately display this 
second sense of a beginning, in that much of the story of a fictional character usually 
involves a historical causal history of who the character can be taken to be at 
whatever point in the story at which we are reading about the character. According 
to MacIntyre, this second sense of a beginning seems to be closely related to who 
we take ourselves to be at the present moment of our lives. Here,  these beginnings 
that inform how we got to the point at which we are telling the story about who we are, 
converge and hence constitute who one is at present.  
 
In terms of the end of a human life story, MacIntyre admits that we do not have access 
to the actual end of our life stories in the middle of living our lives. What we see here 
is that MacIntyre chooses to accept the disanalogy between the temporal nature of a 
fictional character and a human self. However, as I will proceed to show, MacIntyre 
is interested in showing that this does not undermine the ability to understand a 
human life as a temporal narrative unity.  In short, our lives are projected into the 
futures that are undefined and unpredictable for us as the characters living these 
narratives. Even more so, as characters of our own life stories, we are not present to 
experience the actual end of our personal stories. This is given by the fact that when 
we die, we are not there to take a survey of our own personal stories in their actual 
completion. However, just like a fictional character in the middle of its life, we are 
consistently propelled into our futures and are projected into an unfolding narrative 
(MacIntyre, 1981:216). An interesting aspect of a human life is that in the middle of 
living it, we find ourselves having gotten to where we are now as a result of our past 
and our future. A future that is a function of the ends and goals we have projected for 
our lives. Macintyre claims, in Aristotelian terms, that it is our telos that connects who 
we are at every present moment with our futures. The conception of the good we 
pursue, which can be changed and altered throughout the entirety of one’s life, is 
integral to who one sees themselves as being amid living one’s life. It is a 
quintessential characteristic of a human life that it is active and not merely aimed at 
survival. As such, for one’s life to be active, one must have a vision (telos) of who one 
wants to be and the kind of life one wants to live overall. This vision can be said to 
feed back into who they see themselves as being at present. In working in the present 
so that they may one day live their future, they are critically always connected to their 
future in the present. What we see emerging when we speak of a unity of the human 
life in MacIntyrean terms is a life that finds and lives for an ethical goal or end. 
 
The nature of the end as associated with the telos of one’s life reveals a final claim 
about the nature of the MacIntyrean narrative unity. This is the fact that a narrative 
unity is something that we can succeed or fail to achieve. He classifies “the unity of 
a human life as the unity of a narrative quest” (MacIntyre, 1981:219). He goes on to 
claim that “quests sometimes fail, are frustrated, abandoned or dissipated into 
distractions, and human lives can fail in this sense too” (MacIntyre, 1981:219). 
Macintyre claims that to evaluate the success of a human life as a whole, we must 
look at the success of the narrated quest for one’s telos. Here, the idea behind a 
unified self can fail to be attained if one fails to live a life that is spent seeking a good 
life for oneself. Conversely, if one fails to live in pursuit of good life, one may to fail to 
achieve a unified self. The only criterion of failure of unifying the self, as such, is laden 
in one’s dedication to the attainment of their telos. 
 
This, in essence, is the conception of the self as a narrative unity that MacIntyre 
provides that I hope is a good candidate for the self we are true to when we are being 
authentic. To show that I would be justified in using this conception of the self as a 
starting point in providing an account for what it is for someone to be authentic, I want 
to show how MacIntyre’s intentions for exploring the unity of self can easily be 
transposed onto my conceptual analysis of authenticity. The main project of 
MacIntyre’s After Virtue is to provide a complete account of the virtues that is both 
non-arbitrary and adequate. To do so, MacIntyre claims that a complete account of 
the virtues necessarily presupposes an overriding good or moral purpose for which 
all other goods are subordinate, which is only intelligible under the guise of the unity 
of a human life (MacIntyre, 1981:202). MacIntyre (1981:205) states that “the unity of 
a virtue in someone’s life is intelligible only as a characteristic of a unitary life, a life 
that can be conceived as virtuous.” This means that if we want to determine if 
someone is virtuous right now, we would need more than just discrete episodes of 
their lives to make this judgment. If our inquiry stopped on discrete episodes to 
determine whether one is virtuous, we run the risk of indeterminacy of judging one as 
virtuous. This will be given by the good we would attach to the virtue being dictated 
by the situation, leaving the virtues in threat of arbitrariness. We need the totality of 
who one is, the unity of who one is, to decipher whether one is a good person in 
character. This allows us to conceive of the virtuousness of someone’s character as 
something that is not given by happenstances, but by the display of virtuousness 
consistently in who they are.  
 
The same can be said for authenticity, in that I am of the view that we need the unified 
self to uncover what it is for someone to be authentic right now. In appealing to the 
narrative unity of self as a promising candidate of the self which one is being true to, 
I hope to show that this unified self can also help us adequately understand what it is 
for one to be authentic right now or in the middle of living their lives. This is key to a 
tenable understanding of authenticity; in that we need to have a way to evaluate an 
entire self as being authentic in a way that is compatible with understanding 
authenticity as a state one can achieve while living their lives. These are other related 
considered judgments about authenticity that I hope to preserve in my philosophical 
conception of authenticity. Otherwise, likely, authenticity will also face threats of 
arbitrariness that MacIntyre claims virtue could face. It will be difficult to reliably 
attribute authenticity as a quality of self that one possesses if we look at discrete 
happenstances in their lives. Authenticity requires that we attribute it to who someone 
is as a whole.  It is unlikely that all that someone is can be reasonably taken to be 
encapsulated in a particular event, action, or behaviour in their action. To make 
judgments about who one is, we need to look at who one is holistically. It is for this 
reason that I take the narrative unity of self as a key component of understanding 
what it is to be authentic, in the same way, Macintyre takes the unified self as key to 
understanding what it is to be virtuousness. However, the question arises: does 
MacIntyre’s notion succeed in showing how the virtues require the unified self? And 
if not, does this show that we cannot take authenticity to require a unified self as that 



























































Modifying MacIntyre: The Extrapolated Narrative 
Unity of Self [ENUS] 
 
 
n this chapter, I start by evaluating the cogency of MacIntyre’s conception of the 
narrative unity of self. This will be done by engaging Bernard Williams’ formidable 
scepticism against the tenability of MacIntyre’s approach, which seeks to use the 
unified self as a basis for the non-arbitrariness of virtuousness. This scepticism, as I 
showed at the end of the previous chapter, has a significant bearing on my ability to 
give an adequate conception of authenticity. If Bernard Williams succeeds in showing 
that the unified self can in no way tell us how to be virtuous right now, it is likely that 
we cannot tenably appeal to the unified self to explain what it is for someone to be 
authentic amid their life either. Here, I will show that due to the limitations and 
ambiguities in MacIntyre’s presentation of his narrative unity of self, his view is 
I 
rendered considerably untenable by Williams’ scepticism. However, I am inclined to 
preserve the idea of a narrative unified self as the self which we are being true to 
when we are being authentic. As such, I seek to modify MacIntyre’s notion of a 
narrative unity of self by providing my account of the Extrapolated Narrative Unity of 
Self [ENUS]. The ENUS is the story of who one is- which is a story that comprises of 
all that one is and all that one can possibly take themselves to be. As I will show in 
my development of the ENUS, I will aim to provide a tenable understanding of the 
unified self that can withstand Williams’ scepticism, positioning it as a promising 
account of the self that one is being true to when being authentic.  
 
3.1 Williams’ Scepticism about the Unified Self 
 
Bernard Williams (2007) in Life as Narrative provides the most formidable critique of 
MacIntyre’s conception of the self as a narrative unity. Williams starts off by claiming 
that “the unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest” is significantly 
ambiguous (MacIntyre, 1981:219). Claiming to be charitable to MacIntyre, Williams 
settles the ambiguity in favour of interpreting the unity of a narrative quest as a quest 
for narrative as opposed to a narrative of a quest. He takes it to be the case that when 
attaching the criteria of success or failure to the unified self, MacIntyre seems to be 
saying that one can succeed or fail to conceive of their lives as a narrative whole. 
However, I am of the view that MacIntyre does intend to refer both to the quest for 
narrative and the narrative of a quest in distinctive senses that MacIntyre himself does 
not make explicit. To some extent, I take MacIntyre to refer to a narrative of a quest 
in so far as the quest is the pursuit of one’s telos. This is something he states rather 
explicitly, saying that a person who fails to live in active pursuit of his telos would be 
unable to conceive of his life as a unified whole. MacIntyre also claims that our life 
stories are lived before they are told. We can imagine that our ability to conceive our 
lives as a whole in a way that reflects the life story as we have lived it comes with no 
guarantees and is something we can succeed and fail to do. In this sense, we can 
perhaps settle the ambiguity without having to abandon the two senses in which one 
can construe the unity of the self as a narrative quest. 
 
However, even when focusing on the unified self as the success of a quest for 
narrative, two lines of scepticism against MacIntyre arise. First, Williams is sceptical 
about the role narrativity plays in helping us understand a human life as a coherent 
whole. This line of scepticism pushes us to consider the possible redundancy of 
narrativity in understanding one’s life as a unified whole. Here, Williams focuses 
particularly on MacIntyre’s claim that “stories are first lived before they are told- 
except in the case of fiction” (MacIntyre, 1981:212). We can take MacIntyre to mean 
that a human life being lived takes on a narrative structure that precedes the narration 
of that life. To this, Williams (2007:306) asks: When Macintyre says that the narrative 
structure of someone’s life precedes his narration of it, “does Macintyre mean that 
[this structure] is prior to fictional narration, to any artful narration or any telling at all?”. 
If MacIntyre means to say that it is prior to any telling at all, then we might take it to 
mean that there is a good explanatory tale of one’s actions and one’s life which 
precedes the telling of one’s story (Williams, 2007:306). By explanatory tale, Williams 
is referring to the temporal sequence of happenstances that are a part of a causal 
chain that makes up a person’s actual life lived. Differently, we can understand this 
explanatory tale as a kind of proto narrative. If this is what MacIntyre is referring to, 
Williams claims that the truth of the explanatory tale remains in-tact even if it was 
never narrated. Williams does, however, claim that we cannot think of a proto 
narrative that completely precedes our telling of a human life’s story in this way. This 
is because part of the explanation of what an agent is doing or how they are behaving 
is dependent on what they claim to be doing. So, given this, it seems that a narrative 
structure cannot be completely prior to narration.  
 
Alternatively, we could interpret MacIntyre as claiming that the explanatory tale is 
separate to some extent but is in an important way vindicated by the artful telling 
about oneself. However, if we were to accept this, Williams claims that we would need 
a prior conception of what a human life looks like before we can narrate that human 
life. Williams (2007:306) claims that “we could not identify those narratives unless we 
already have a conception of a human life.” This poses a threat of redundancy in 
conceiving of a human life and, subsequently, one’s self in terms of a narrative.  Here, 
if we can provide a conception of a human life before we narrate it, it would mean 
that narrativity becomes redundant to our understanding of a unified self. To this, 
MacIntyre claims that “we understand the idea of a narrative about a person because 
we understand what a person is, but we also understand what a person is because 
of a narrative about them” (quoted in Williams, 2007:307). However, as Williams 
points out, without an adequate explanation of the co-dependency between what a 
person is and the narrative, MacIntyre may not be able to explain the essential role 
narrativity plays in the conception of who one is.  
 
In order to respond to Williams, we could attempt to take a closer look at MacIntyre’s 
exposition on the relationship between personal identity and the narrative self. Here, 
I want to revisit MacIntyre’s own claims about the interdependence between one’s 
explanatory tale and the narrative unity of self, in order to see if his exploration sheds 
further light on the respective roles they play in their interaction. MacIntyre (1981:218) 
tells us that there is a relation of “mutual presupposition” between the narrative self 
and the notion of a person. In evaluating personal identity theories of psychological 
continuity, such as those of Locke and his contemporaries like Parfit, MacIntyre 
claims that they all underdetermine the role that a person’s background has in 
explaining who they are (MacIntyre, 1981:217). What Williams seems to be referring 
to when speaking of the explanatory tale of a human life seems closer to what 
MacIntyre identifies as personal identity theories of psychological continuity. This is 
because psychological continuity theories construe the explanatory tale and person 
identity as being the same, in that they both posit the causal chain of psychological 
states and events in an individual’s life as making up the human life. Returning to his 
claim about the problem with personal identity, MacIntyre claims that personal 
identity theories, focusing solely on a causal chain of happenings as constituting the 
person, give us an impoverished view of the individual. As his view of narrativity 
purports, we need to acknowledge that people’s lives are nested in the stories of their 
context as well as in the stories of others (MacIntyre, 1981:217). For MacIntyre, an 
individual’s history is “provided by the concept of a story and of that kind of unity of 
character which a story requires” (MacIntyre, 1981:217).  
 
Admittedly, while MacIntyre still proves elusive in his exposition here, we can begin 
to gather what he may mean. I take it that he says we already think about the 
background which someone finds themselves in (a key constitutive factor of who one 
is) in terms of a story. Taking the background to be constitutive of who one is, we 
cannot merely conceive of a person in a substantive sense without looking at the 
stories of where they find themselves in the first place. Here, MacIntyre seems to be 
saying that the explanatory tale of one’s life has to be abstracted from the story of the 
context and the roles one occupies in the stories of others already. So, in terms of the 
role narrativity plays in helping us understand what a person is, the story of the 
context and of others related to that person give us the key raw material that will be 
pieced together to bring about that causal chain of events that will be taken to make 
up the person in the first place. Furthermore, MacIntyre also claims that narrating 
about oneself plays a key role in establishing the train of events that make up the 
explanatory tale of a human life in the first place. Here, MacIntyre refers to the notion 
of accountability of the self. MacIntyre claims that as we live our lives, we have to 
consistently position ourselves as being ready to explain why it is that we do what we 
do and the reasons why we do those things- “often pondering between [someone’s] 
account of what I did and my account of what I did” (MacIntyre, 1981:218).  To be 
able to provide answers to this, we are said to need to establish a bare narrative of 
the things we did and our reasons for doing them, too. Here, we see that artful telling 
about oneself, according to MacIntyre, plays a role of tying together the explanatory 
tale as well.  
 
In explaining the dependence of the narrative on personal identity, MacIntyre also 
appeals to the notion of accountability. Here, he focuses on the claim that each 
individual is “the subject of a history that is [his] own and no one else’s” (MacIntyre, 
1981:217). What this means is that if you want to give an intelligible tale of you are, 
you would have to appeal and make use of your life history which presents itself as a 
complexity of events from your birth to death. Here, I take it that MacIntyre believes 
that an individual must recognize and take ownership of the fact that their life history 
is in an important sense theirs and only theirs. When an individual does so, they are 
taking accountability of the raw material, the bare actions and behaviours that make 
up the causal chain of one’s life, to compose an intelligible narrative about oneself in 
the first place. Furthermore, we instil the intelligibility of our personal narrative by 
establishing a continuity in the series of events that make up the explanatory tale of 
our lives. Here, I take it that MacIntyre offers a decent enough explanation of the 
dynamic of the inter-dependency between the explanatory tale and the narrative of 
self. Whereas the narrative needs the explanatory tale for its intelligibility, the 
explanatory tale requires narrativity (mainly in the form of the story of our background) 
in order to bring coherency to a life lived. However, MacIntyre faces a challenge he 
cannot meet in Williams’ second line of scepticism.  
 
In his second line of scepticism, Williams argues against thinking of a human life as 
a unity. Williams claims that is implausible, or even incorrect, to speak of a unified 
human life in the first place. Williams claims that there is an irreconcilable disanalogy 
between a fictional character’s life and a real human life, regarding the nature of their 
respective temporalities. MacIntyre claims that in virtue of how fictional characters 
are presented as one goes through their stories, they, like us, do not know their 
futures (Williams, 2007:310). However, Williams claims that the reason they don’t 
know their future is very different from the reason why human beings do not know 
theirs. The reason that fictional characters do not know their future is simply because 
they do not have one. This is because all they are and ever could be has already 
been captured, cover to cover, in the literary works in which they are found (Williams, 
2007:310). In reading fictional characters, we read them as all they could have been, 
as characters whose story line is always conceivable (at least by the author) from the 
very beginning (Williams, 2007:311). This is not the case for human lives. Our futures 
are in a significant way unpredictable and full of existential possibilities that have not 
yet been actualized. 
 
The future of a fictional character’s life is always already there; but is not yet realized 
in the middle of reading a book. Williams takes the lives of fictional characters as 
given temporal wholes in a way that our lives cannot be. As Williams (2007:312) 
states, “it’s essential to fictional characters that their wholeness always already be 
there and it is essential to ours that it is not”. Given that our lives are not given wholes, 
the only way to understand our lives as we live them and who we are is by appealing 
to what has emerged so far as who one takes oneself to be (Williams, 2007:312). In 
this view, for me to continue being who I take myself to be so far, it is enough that I 
take my behaviour and actions exhibited at present as sufficient to who I am right 
now. This shows that the coherence of a human life can never be complete or whole 
in the way MacIntyre imagines. This is because a human life’s future is always a future 
unlived. Subsequently, this future is always unavailable to the individual, even if it still 
belongs to that individual. Here, Williams presents a strong challenge against the 
tenability of the unified self.  
 
I believe that MacIntyre is susceptible to the criticisms levelled against him with 
regards to conceiving of the self as a unity. The criticism is a pervasive issue primarily 
due to MacIntyre’s ambiguity on the nature of narrative unity. Firstly, the claim that 
the narrative unity is a unity from birth to middle to death makes it appear that he 
thinks the self is an actual unity that combines one’s actual past and present with their 
actual unrealized future until their death. It is entirely plausible that after an 
individual’s death, we may be able to consider them to be a unity in this sense. 
However, this idea does not seem to tell us much about an individual who is in the 
middle of living their lives, because they cannot integrate a future to which they have 
no access. This is, of course, something that MacIntyre admits, but his solution to this 
does not help with clearing up this issue. MacIntyre suggests thinking of the future 
being integrated into one’s life as being given by their projection into their telos that 
feeds back into who we are now. 
 
However, given that the pursuit and attainment of one’s telos is something that 
actually takes place in the course of one’s life until one dies, MacIntyre does not seem 
to clarify between whether we are still integrating the actual course of our pursuit of 
the telos or if we are merely interested in how the telos helps us shape who we are at 
present. What MacIntyre may have been doing is, in effect, referring to a multitude of 
narrative unities of the self, each with their respective nature. On one level, he seems 
to be asserting that there is an actual unity that encompasses an entire human life — 
a unity that Williams’ rightfully argues we cannot make sense of as being present in 
the middle of a person’s life. Alternatively, there is a unity that is brought by the telos. 
However, he would need to be clear about which of these is actually doing the work 
of grounding the unity of the virtues. In the context of MacIntyre’s work, this confusion 
about the nature of the unity brings warrant to Williams’ claim that we cannot make 
use of MacIntyre’s notion of the unity to tell us how to be virtuous right now.  
 
However, we can take it that when MacIntyre (1981:215) claims that “there is no 
present that is not shaped by some image of the future… which always presents itself 
in the form of the telos”, he means to claim that the unity in question is not the literal 
(as opposed to figurative) unity of one’s life from birth to middle to death. Here, we 
can see that this unity can tell us how to be virtuous right now by an appeal to one’s 
telos as playing a constitutive role in the unity of self. This may mean that we can, 
after all, make use of the narrative unity of self to understand what it is for one to be 
authentic in the middle of living one’s life, as well. However, this invites further issues. 
What happens when one’s telos changes? What happens when one actually fails to 
attain the good life for themselves? We need to have an understanding of the 
implications on the unity of self. Given that the human life is so vulnerable and 
rendered unstable by its actual but not yet actualized future, the threat to the tenability 
of thinking of oneself as a unity remains. If someone changes their telos, do we still 
consider them to be a unified self after the fact? What qualifies their new self as a 
unity? What happens to who they were before?  
 
MacIntyre himself, unfortunately, fails to account for these issues that his account 
brings about. As such, while there may be ways for MacIntyre to meet the challenges 
set by Williams, he would still need to do much more work in providing a tenable and 
adequate understanding of the self as a narrative unity. Given that MacIntyre does 
not do so in his account, I seek to provide my own account of the unified self. This 
unified self that I term the Extrapolated Unity of the Self (ENUS) incorporate the robust 
elements of MacIntyre’s account of the self and will also make modifications to 
MacIntyre’s view. At the end of section 3.2., I hope to have provided a more robust 
view of the unity of self that can withstand the issues raised by Williams and can also 
be tenable for us to take it as that to which we are true when we are being authentic.  
 
3.2 The Extrapolated Narrative Unity of Self (ENUS) as a Modification of 
MacIntyre’s Narrative Unity 
 
In this section, I start by giving a full account of what the ENUS is. I will then move to 
give detailed explanations of its components, particularly discussing them in 
comparison to MacIntyre’s conception of narrative unity. This will be done by 
clarifying which components of MacIntyre’s narrative unity of self I plan to integrate 
into this ENUS, and which components constitute the modifications I have made to 
MacIntyre’s account of the narrative unity. Throughout, I will illustrate how my account 
puts to rest concerns from Williams and additional concerns about the tenability of a 
narrative unity. In doing so, I will take it that ENUS can serve as the self which one is 
being true to when attempting to understand what it is for someone to be authentic at 
present. 
 
Before proceeding, the best way to explain the Extrapolated Narrative Unity of Self is 
to explain it in terms of an individual in the middle of living his life. The Extrapolated 
Narrative Unity of Self, in contrast to an actual metaphysical unity of self from one’s 
birth to death, is a narrative configuration that combines a) an individual’s actual 
history and b) the vision of who they want to be, as constituting who that person is at 
the present moment. The story of who you are now, which is the self, is an 
extrapolated combination of the story of what brought you to seeing yourself as who 
you are now with the vision that you have for your own life. The vision of who you want 
to be is just as present in who you are now as the past that has brought you to where 
you are now. At this point, we can think of it in the following way: Who I am now is in 
part the story I tell of how I got to be who I am now. Another part of who I am is given 
by the life that I aim to live, and how I am living now to realize my telos to its fullest is 
what essentially brings unity to my life. The extrapolation component of this self is 
particularly important. By extrapolated, I mean to say that this combination of the story 
of your past and the lived vision of who you want to be presents itself as a coherent 
story of self that persists beyond our present observations of who we are now. 
Concerning our actual futures, the self is a story that has integrated one’s story about 
one’s past and the story about one’s vision for oneself. This story made up of these 
two integrated stories is a unity which the agent takes to be something that will persist 
throughout that agent’s life as an answer to the question “Who am I?”, at the current 
moment of giving that answer. 
 
Two things are important for the accuracy and intelligibility of the story of who you are 
now as being adequately reflective of who one really is. Firstly, it is imperative that 
the story of who one is be adequately reflective of the explanatory tale of one’s life as 
they have lived it. What I take to be the explanatory tale is similar to Williams’ and 
MacIntyre’s construal of it. However, I take it to be significantly more complex than 
they let it appear. I am of the view that the explanatory tale of an individual’s life does 
not necessarily take the linear form that seems to be implied in both MacIntyre and 
Williams’ construal of it. I am of the view that an individual’s life in actuality is an 
overwhelming complexity of events and happenstances. Throughout our lives, there 
are a lot of things that we do, a lot of things that happen to us and a lot of ways we 
behave that can serve as an explanation of how we got to where we are now. As 
such, the explanatory tale of the self is something that leans to the side of obscurity, 
even though the tale is a causal chain of events that make up a person’s life till the 
present moment. What do I mean by this? Even though we can make sense of a life 
lived as a continuous causal chain of events, this causal chain may be too difficult to 
pin down in linear terms. This is because of all the overwhelming number of events 
that may warrantably and equally demand to have a place as crucial components of 
one’s explanatory tale. This is revealed by the idea that all the things that happen to 
us or the things that we do bring shape to who we are at different levels of 
significance, but still serve as a part of the explanation for who we actually are. In the 
process of configuring the story of who you are at the current moment, coherency in 
your understanding of who you are requires that you take aspects of your explanatory 
tale that significantly demand articulation as being constitutive of your personal story. 
In addition, the story of who you are must reflect the basic chronological thread of 
your explanatory tale. Here, we see that the story of who one is now must adequately 
reflect and bring coherence to the explanatory tale of one’s life until the present 
moment.  
 
The second aspect that is important for the accuracy and intelligibility of the ENUS 
as the story of who one is now has much more to do with one’s relation to, and the 
well-foundedness of, one’s vision for how one wants one’s life to pan out. In terms of 
a person’s relation to their vision, how they have lived and are living so far needs to 
be a reflection of someone who is living to realize their telos. This is vindicated 
significantly by appeal to the explanatory tale of one’s life. An individual who is 
adequately living in a way that actualizes his telos should be able to answer questions 
like: “What is it that you are doing and have done to realize your telos?” and “In what 
ways are you presently living, such that you are living consistently and adequately 
lined up with your telos?”. Answers to these questions are found by appealing to your 
explanatory tale as evidence of you living in accordance with the vision you set for 
your life. Now, visions of a good life are susceptible to issues of their own: most 
notably, wishful thinking. For example, many people wish to become billionaires one 
day, but do not act or behave in such a way that this wish can be taken to be in the 
realm of possibility for them. To combat wishful thinking, one’s vision of the life they 
want to live must be well-founded. The well-founded nature of one’s vision is laden 
again in whether the individual is adequately living in such a way that they are actively 
actualizing their vision in the present. Again, this simply requires a person to be able 
to account for how it is that they are actualizing the vision by pointing to how it is that 
they are living their lives at the present moment. The vision that we are taking to be 
what brings the unity of self together is in this important sense; a lived vision.  
 
This narrative unity, as a combination of how one’s life story has panned out so far 
and one’s lived vision for how it will pan out, is what is of interest in speaking of the 
ENUS. Our construal of the ENUS so far should reveal some peculiarities about the 
nature of its unity which need further exposition as well. I postulate that we need not 
think of this unity as a given unity. That is, the ENUS is not a representation of all that 
one will and ever can be in the strict metaphysical sense. We need not assert that 
this ENUS is all you ever will be to understand it as a unity. To do so would be to 
undermine the pervasiveness of how unpredictable our futures are and how our 
futures can still shape a significant portion of the self. Moving to a somewhat 
controversial aspect of my conception of the self, I am of the view that the ENUS is 
instead a story of all that one is, and all that one can possibly take themselves to be 
at a given moment.  
 
Here, the language of existential possibilities that are available to an individual at a 
given moment in their lives is important. In explaining what is meant here, I will refer 
to Charles Taylor’s (1989) notion of “taking a stance in inescapable moral 
frameworks” and Somogy Varga’s (2011) notion of existential possibilities as 
alternativeless to best articulate the nature of ENUS’s unity that I have in mind. 
Charles Taylor, in Sources of the Self, claims that a significant part of our human 
agency is laden with encounters with questions about how, why, and with whom you 
should live your life. Questions of how a person should live their life are a particular 
type of problematic: a problematic that takes issue with what constitutes a fully lived 
life for the subject living that life. These questions should not be taken lightly, based 
on the fact that they have a bearing on how a life unfolds right now. Answering that 
one should live this way as opposed to that way, precedes a space of questions that 
involves strong evaluations, according to Taylor (1989:14). Issues of how, why, where 
and with whom to live one’s life “are issues of strong evaluation because the people 
who ask these questions have no doubt that one can take a wrong turn and hence 
fail to live a full [fulfilling] life” (Taylor, 1989:14). Notably, Taylor (1989:19) goes on to 
say that this space where we make strong qualitative distinctions about issues of 
strong evaluation allows an agent to perceive their own mode of living as 
“incomparably higher than the others which are more readily available.” Amongst the 
alternative possible modes that compete for significance in determining how one 
should live their life, that which the individual takes to be incomparably higher than 
the others is what we take to be the answer to who one is (Taylor, 1989:27).  
 
Before further engaging these insights from Taylor, I also want to look at Varga’s 
insights regarding existential choices. In Authenticity as an Ethical Ideal, Varga 
(2011:115) speaks of existential choices as those “alternativeless choices with which 
we constitute ourselves”. In referring to an existential choice as alternativeless, he 
means to say that all the other possibilities of being cannot adequately be described 
by the person living that life as viable options of being (Varga, 2011:115). Here, the 
alternative ways of being are “eliminated with unusual force” in favour of an 
alternativeless alternative that one cannot help but Be (Varga, 2011:115). Returning 
to the Extrapolated Narrative Unity of Self, I stated that the ENUS is the story of all 
that one is, and all that one can possibly take themselves to be at a given moment. 
What I take this to mean is that given the existential possibilities of being that one has 
available to him or sees possible for him, the ENUS encompasses a way of being for 
the agent, which is incomparably higher than others and is alternativeless in the 
senses discussed above. Therefore, what is taken to be the unity of self at present is 
the extrapolated way of being that one cannot help but be, in the face of alternative 
ways of being that are available to one. The basic idea behind this is that a person 
cannot conceive of themselves as being what they deem impossible or inviable to 
Be.  
 
This invites an opportunity to provide an answer to what happens in the case where 
one changes one’s telos. To answer this, we need to be aware of what is happening 
within the realm of existential possibilities. Before proceeding, I do want to assert that 
the aim here is to make the ENUS as compatible as possible with the fact that our 
lives, and the lives we take as irrevocably those that we want to live, can change in 
the future. In the situation where a person changes their telos, this can only come 
about because of a new existential possibility being open which was not previously 
available to them. This telos competes with the previous one as an existential 
possibility that is to be taken as incomparably higher or alternativeless to any one 
vision that one could have for one’s life. In the case where they adopt a new telos, 
they would need to also live in such a way that reflects the active actualization of their 
new telos in order to have who they are be considered a unified self. Upon adopting 
and living in a way that signifies the active realization of the new telos, we take an 
individual who now lives in this way as still possessing an ENUS. However, there have 
now been key changes to his ENUS. The story of who all one is and can possibly take 
themselves to be changes as a result of the new telos but remains intact as a unity 
because it is still all that the individual can possibly take themselves to be, now. The 
ENUS that they took themselves to irrevocably be before the telos changed also plays 
a constitutive role in making them who they are now. In adopting a new telos, an 
individual must be able to adequately explain why it is that they changed who they 
envisioned themselves being and must see their first ENUS as now being an aspect 
of the story of who they once were. I have illustrated what I take to occur when 





Figure 1: Modelling the ENUS over Changes in Telos. 
 
In the above illustration, the inner-most circle represents one’s initial ENUS. Here, 
given all the existential possibilities that an individual has available to him or takes to 
be readily in reach, the self is the story of who he is and all he can possibly take 
himself to be at present. In the case that one finds a new telos, they now discover 
that unlike they had thought before, the innermost ENUS no longer represents all that 
they possibly take themselves to be. As such, their initial ENUS now becomes a part 
of the story of all that they have been up to the point of discovering their new telos. 
After that, one forms a new ENUS which envelopes the previous one (the previous 
one now becomes part of the story of who you are). One then establishes the unity of 
the new ENUS by living in a way that signifies the active realization of the new telos. 
This process can be said to continue in so far as one discovers a new telos, which 
one takes to be an irrevocable expression of who one sees oneself becoming. It is 
crucial to note that this is not to mean that there are multiple selves, per se. It is to 
say that at any given moment of one’s life, there is only one unity of self that can be 
taken to be who one can possibly conceive of themselves as being. In thinking of the 
ENUS in the sense of the concentric circles in the above figure, I make the idea that 
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oneself as being can change. I do so without risking the tenability of understanding 
the self as an extrapolated unity at all points of an individual’s life.  
 
In going back to Williams’ scepticism about the narrative unity, I am of the view that 
my account of the ENUS can adequately address Williams’ concerns. I want to start 
by addressing the potential redundancy of narrativity that can be brought about by 
already having an explanatory tale of a human life. Concerning this, I pushed back 
against Williams’ presupposition that the causal chain of events that makes up one’s 
explanatory tale is structured in a way that is easily perceivable or intelligible prior to 
the artful telling about the self. As I stated, the complexity of events and the sheer 
overwhelming number of events that make up a human life makes it surprisingly 
difficult to determine what it is exactly that caused another event in your life. At best, 
we can think of this chain of events as a bare chronological continuity that has 
clusters of events that serve as candidates in explaining the story of someone’s life. 
It is in telling a story about oneself that one takes pieces from their explanatory tale 
and coherently organizes them chronologically, building an intelligible conception of 
who one is. In constructing the stories about ourselves, we are essentially taking 
pieces from the very complex and obscure explanatory tale which demand 
articulation as constitutive of who we are, and we organize them in a way that stays 
true to the chronological nature of the explanatory tale. The story of who one is and 
possibly can be necessitates the intelligibility and coherency of a life lived. It is 
through the self as an ENUS, as the story of who one is, that one can intelligibly 
answer the question “Who am I?”  
 
Regarding Williams’ issues about the unity of the self, I believe that I have put many 
of the issues to rest by conceiving of the unity of a human life as an extrapolated unity 
as opposed to an actual metaphysical unity. The ENUS being an extrapolation helps 
us integrate understanding of who one is as involving the future in the only way that 
is available to us at present. In speaking about the ENUS being the story of who one 
is now, constituted of all that one is and all that one possibly conceives themselves 
as being at that point, we can understand the unified self as including the future in 
the unity as an indefinite conclusion. In speaking of the ENUS, we get the sense that 
one’s life is a unity, up until one’s telos changes. At the point at which one’s telos 
changes, a person is still a unity now, where the unity is all that they are and have 
been till that point combined with all that they possibly see themselves as being at 
that same point. Also, speaking about a lived vision seemingly solidifies the notion of 
a unity with one’s future being present at all times. Where a person lives and 
continues to live in such a way that they can be interpreted as actualizing their future, 
my view is that their self can be taken to be a unity that is adequately connected to 
their future. The upside of thinking of the self as an extrapolation is that the unity of 
self is stabilized by the individual seeing themselves as being all that they are and 
could possibly be, even beyond their current observations of who they are now. This 
can be said to adequately stabilize the unity of the self even in the face of the 
unpredictability of one’s future.  
 
In postulating the ENUS, I hope to have provided a complete account of the self as a 
unity at all given times in one’s life. What I have shown here is that there is a tenable 
way of interpreting the self as a unity in the middle of one living their lives. This was 
particularly shown by the kind of relationship one has with one’s futures when one 
thinks of who one is as an extrapolated narrative unity. As such, having shown that it 
is intelligible to think of the self as a unity in the middle of one’s life, I have 
subsequently shown that we can see the ENUS as key to understanding whether an 
individual is being authentic at the present moment. This is because the ENUS is the 
self that one has to be true to at any given moment of one’s life in order to be 
considered as authentic. I now proceed to show what being true to one’s ENUS 






































What Being True to Oneself Entails 
 
n this chapter, I discuss the next key problematic in providing a conception of 
authenticity that aims to achieve reflective equilibrium. Here, I pose the following 
question: What does being true to oneself entail? Having taken the self in question 
to be the Extrapolated Narrative Unity of Self, the question now becomes: What does 
being true to one’s ENUS entail? To best answer this question, I will mostly focus on 
the process of becoming authentic, in order to articulate what is involved in an 
individual getting to a point where they are authentic. Now, in terms of our considered 
judgments about what it is to be true to one’s self, we generally cite three primary 
considerations as important. The first considered judgment is that being true to one’s 
self requires some kind of effort or actionability on the part of the individual who wants 
to be authentic. More particularly, this effort or actionability is directed towards one’s 
relationship with how one expresses one’s self. This is a two-fold considered 
judgment. On the one hand, being true to oneself requires the same efforts of 
truthfulness towards oneself about oneself. Authenticity also requires that you 
unreservedly take on the various social and normative demands that flow from the 
various aspects of self that make up your ENUS. Alternatively, we can also determine 
whether someone is being authentic by looking at how their behaviour and actions  




The second considered judgment we generally hold about being true to oneself is 
that one adequately embodies the type of individual that one describes oneself as 
being. Here, we are interested in whether someone is really who they claim, describe, 
and present themselves as being. The third considered judgment is that one is being 
true to oneself when what one does, how one behaves, and one’s understanding of 
who one is, are primarily self-originating. Only you are in the best position to know 
who you are, even if we accept that sometimes, other people’s insights into who you 
are can illuminate aspects of yourself that you did not realize are there. The trueness 
in being true to oneself is seen to be predicated on living for oneself. This need not 
be construed in a selfish sense. Instead, it should be construed as not living for 
pleasing people’s expectations of who you should be, or not living primarily for the 
approval of others. This is largely because the expectations and approval of others 
may come at the cost of asserting who we genuinely believe we are and may call for 
the displacement of who we unequivocally take ourselves to be to make others 
happy. These three considered judgments are interrelated, mostly because 
judgments of whether a person is really who they claim to be come to be vindicated 
by observing the effort they put into affirming, asserting, and expressing their ENUS 
in a reliable and primarily self-originating manner.  
 
In providing a conceptual analysis of what it means to be true to one’s ENUS, I will 
primarily focus on three key aspects of the ENUS ,and the kind of effort and action 
each of these aspects requires from the individual to be considered authentic. In the 
first section, I will look at the effort required in presiding over the narrative 
configuration of one’s ENUS. In the second section, I will focus on the effort required 
in presiding over the assertion and expression of one’s ENUS to oneself and others. 
In the last section, I will focus on how one should relate their ENUS to their patiency 
in the world. These three aspects are important for establishing, reinforcing, and 
maintaining the ENUS as being who one truly is. Each of these, as I will proceed to 
discuss in-depth, require one to behave and act in a way towards one’s ENUS that 
constitute the effort of being true to oneself.  
 
4.1 How One Presides over the Narrative Configuration of Their ENUS  
 
Before we can understand an individual as being true to their ENUS, I believe it is 
important that one makes an effort to establish the truthfulness of their ENUS. What I 
mean here is that it would be non sequitur to describe someone as being true to 
themselves if the self they are being true to — if the story they are telling about 
themselves — in no way accurately reflects who they are or the life that they have 
lived. As such, significant attention should be given to how this story of oneself comes 
about, in order to make sense of the idea of being true to oneself in the first place. 
Thus, it is a requirement of being true to oneself that one have a truthful story to tell 
about oneself. The effort of ensuring truthfulness and accuracy in the composition of 
one’s Extrapolated Narrative Unity of Self will be the first requirement of being true to 
oneself that I discuss in this section.  
 
Given that I am interested in the truthful composition of one’s narrative, the effort to 
ensure the truthfulness and accuracy in one’s Extrapolated Narrative Unity of Self will 
be a function of the way one fulfils one’s role as the co-author and chief editor of one’s 
narrative. Truthfulness and accuracy are significantly dependent on how one 
composes or configures one’s personal narrative. Here, I think it is important that I 
state what I mean when I speak of narrative configuration. Narrative configuration, as 
termed by Paul Ricoeur (1995:141), is the process whereby one arranges the facts, 
fortunes, and events from one’s explanatory tale in a way that articulates a coherent 
story about who one is. This process requires a well-reasoned arrangement of the 
facts that come to make up one’s personal narratives by striving for accuracy, 
coherence and concord in providing an accurate answer to the question “Who am 
I?”. I take it that one must carry a certain level of intentionality in assuring accuracy 
in the composition of one’s personal narrative. Related to this, one must make an 
effort to practice as much self-restraint as possible, and resist temptations and 
pressures that threaten to veer one off the facts in the explanatory tale of one’s life. 
Finally, we need to put in the effort of being impartial in how we configure ourselves 
through being open to evaluating the justifiability of other people’s perceptions of our 
own selves when forming our self-understanding.  
 
Concerning the effort of ensuring accuracy, there are two essential things that I 
believe an individual needs to do to achieve the truthfulness of the ENUS. To put it in 
the simplest terms, we need to ensure that we do not consider a merely concocted 
narrative that appears unified as a candidate for an authentic self. We have an interest 
to ensure that who one takes oneself to be adequately reflects one’s life as one has 
lived it, is living it and hopes to live it. Here, what I mean is that one’s ENUS must 
adequately reflect the explanatory tale of one’s life, such that the constitutive 
elements of one’s life story are founded in the factual trajectory that one’s life is taking. 
When one’s ENUS is a factual representation of one’s life as one has lived it, it 
prevents the possibility of mistaking a false or merely wishful self for the true unified 
self. Secondly, a person needs to actually be able to distinguish between merely 
periphery happenstances and those key events that come to have a constitutive force 
in their lives. They need to know what precisely, in the midst of the complexity of the 
explanatory tale of one’s life, demands articulation as a significant contributor to who 
one take oneself to be today. A certain reflectivity is required in this instance to ensure 
that the parts of the story that make up who you are actually play the role that they 
are purported to play in making up who you are. 
 
Bernard Williams (2002) in Truth and Truthfulness discusses truthfulness in the 
procedural sense that is salient to my discussion of the effort one has to put in one’s 
narrative configuration. Williams (2002:127) speaks of truthfulness as the search for 
accuracy in “discovering and coming to believe the truth”. When applying Williams’ 
claim about accuracy to the process of narrative configuration, an individual must 
preside over the configuration process in such a way that he gets his story “correct”. 
An individual seeking to be true to himself must be interested in having the narrative 
of himself reflect the truth of how he has lived his life. The creation of fantasy narratives 
and sheer wishful thinking in who one takes oneself to be must be avoided. Staying 
true to the facts of how one has lived one’s life, as well as aiming for predictive 
accuracy in one’s extrapolation of self, are key to having an accurate picture of who 
one is. One has to take care to avoid obstacles to the process of accurately telling a 
story about oneself. 
 
Let’s look back to the scenario of Themba. In order to configure a story of himself that 
is a true reflection of who he is, it seems important that he stops intentionally 
deceiving himself into believing that he is not gay when he actually is. If we are to 
take his homosexuality as a key explanatory fact of his life, that fact demands to have 
much more significant articulation in the story of who he is than he lets on. To avoid 
seeing his homosexuality as a key constituent of the story of his life is to fail to 
accurately depict his life as he has lived it in his ENUS. As such, he fails to put in the 
effort of truthfulness that is requisite to him being considered true to himself. There is 
a sense in which we know that Themba is not truthful and that he knows that the story 
he is presenting as a depiction of himself cannot be taken as the true story. This is 
seen in how his motivations to be heterosexual are as to conceal the key explanatory 
fact in his life that he is, in fact, gay. 
 
So, we could say that he is not merely failing to get his story correct; he is actively 
avoiding making his story accurate. As such, we can take him to be an individual who 
is actively avoiding being true to who he is because he is purposefully veering away 
from the explanatory tale of his life to avoid the social costs that come with being 
homosexual. Regarding his ENUS, Themba has chosen to narrate out (remove from 
the narrative) an aspect of his actual life which demands articulation. In this instance, 
even if he can construct a narrative self that can appear unified, it is in fact incomplete 
because it omits a constitutive aspect of who he is.  He also seems to have convinced 
himself that by sacrificing who he actually wants to be, he is in effect living a better 
life than he otherwise would if he asserted who he is. While this aspect is more in the 
domain of whether being authentic is generally good (I will address this in the next 
chapter), I think that we can take him to be engaged in wishful thinking by thinking 
he would be living a better-quality life by suppressing his homosexuality. While this 
seems to be going into the direction of ad hoc considerations about whether it is 
always good for someone to assert themselves as homosexual to others, I think we 
can reasonably accept that there is significant damage being done to his quality of 
life in his failure of self-acceptance. It would be suspect to consider him to be living 
a good life due to the level of self-suppression and wilful ignorance of a life that he 
would actually want to live if he did not fear rejection or persecution from others.  
 
In looking at Themba’s story, what I wanted to illustrate is that one needs to be mindful 
and put in the effort not to deceive oneself into telling oneself that one is something 
that one is not. There is a significant demand of honesty towards oneself that is often 
difficult to meet because of the implications it has for how others perceive us.  It is for 
these reasons that the narrative composition of one’s ENUS must display one’s 
agency over oneself as the person living the life that the ENUS represents. What is 
positive here is that this effort was primarily implied in my construal of the ENUS in 
the first place, where the ENUS is characterized as that which brings coherence, 
intelligibility and reflects the explanatory tale of one’s life.  
 
The effort of self-restraint is also involved in assuring accuracy in the composition of 
one’s ENUS. Looking again at Themba, we can see that he perceives asserting 
himself as heterosexual to have significant social benefits that homosexuality does 
not bring about. In this sense, he has taken an ethical egoistic perspective towards 
the configuration of himself, choosing to configure a story about himself that will best 
position him to continue enjoying the social benefits of being perceived as 
heterosexual.  However, in the case of Themba, we would see his assertion of himself 
as heterosexual to be a function of the beguilement of the desirable aspects of 
heterosexuality. What this is ratified by is the likely realization that in choosing to 
pretend to be heterosexual, it is, in fact, his pretence that receives acceptance and 
not who he really is. What can, therefore, seem as being a better way for him to live 
is in actuality not providing him with benefits that we can attribute as being a result of 
who he is. Themba would have an interest in resisting the temptation of being 
something that he is not, mostly because it would result in a life where one’s pretence 
gets the benefits of deception while who one knows oneself to be in actuality is left 
significantly impoverished. One must be able to resist lying or fabricating inaccurate 
stories of who one is, in order to be true to oneself. This again can be done by staying 
true to and accurately representing the explanatory tale of one’s life in the 
configuration of one’s ENUS.  
 
Themba’s story reveals one final aspect of the narrative configuration process that is 
required for establishing the truthfulness of one’s ENUS. This has to do largely with 
ensuring that one actively assumes one’s powers of primary authorship and editing 
over one’s personal narratives, without overdetermining one’s capacity to “always be 
right” about who one takes oneself to be. There is an interest in ensuring that the 
narrative configuration process is adequately in the hands of the person who the story 
is about, without that person unwarrantedly discounting how the role they play in the 
narratives of others can help constitute and refine their understanding of the story 
about who they are. Given that we are social beings who find ourselves to be part of 
the narratives of others and also find ourselves interacting with others, it is important 
to avoid giving others undue power to dictate who you are to you. But it is also 
important that you consciously have a critical attitude over who you take yourself to 
be, as a means to striving for accuracy in the story of who you are. This is, in part, a 
way of ensuring that one avoids being the they-self, as Heidegger (cited from Mulhall, 
1996) puts it. It also helps us take into consideration how others can help us 
understand and conscientize us to aspects of ourselves that we may have overlooked 
or have been unaware of. This is what is meant by the claim that one has to also be 
impartial in assuring the truthfulness of ones’ own story.  
 
My claims here require us, in this project of reflective equilibrium, to refine some of 
the initially considered judgments that are associated with being true to who one is. 
Here, I take it that being true to oneself does not mean that one should be whoever 
one wants to be, simpliciter. We must put qualifications to that statement, due to the 
very fact that it seems to invite considerations that we might intuitively take to conflict 
with what we think authenticity involves. If we are to associate authenticity with 
truthfulness and genuineness, it would be contradictory to say that Themba choosing 
to live a lie is authentic because it is who he wants to be. What we see from this 
section is that being who you want to be mainly involves who your life as you have 
lived it purports you to be. An extrapolated self requires the vision for who you want 
to be in the future to be “on trend” with the trajectory of how you are living your life 
now. This is reinforced by the efforts required in being authentic that have been 




4.2. How One Presides over the Assertion and Expression of Their ENUS 
 
In the previous section, the discussion was mainly set on the establishment of an 
ENUS that is truthful. In this section, I want to focus more on articulating what it is to 
be true to this ENUS that has been constructed truthfully. Here, I want to focus more 
on the effort one has to put into how one asserts oneself and how one expresses who 
one is towards others as a means to ensuring that one is considered as being true to 
oneself. While the previous section was more interested in answering the question 
“How do I construct my personal narrative such that it is a truthful depiction of who I 
am?”; the question here is “What is required for me to affirm my personal narrative in 
a way that it is truly who I am?”. In our ordinary considerations of authenticity, we tend 
to think of the latter question significantly more when we are asking ourselves how to 
be authentic. 
 
What is of interest here is whether one’s ENUS is adequately, reliably and generally 
reflected in what one does and how one behaves. When we ask whether someone is 
being who they truly are, we are asking an evaluative question of consistency. First, 
in terms of how well their actions and behaviour reflect who they say they are. Second, 
in terms of how well they adequately express who they are in a way that reinforces 
the stability of their ENUS. Additionally, we seem to be interested in the confidence 
one has in who one is. What is revealed by the individual’s acceptance and 
internalization of his ENUS is that he comes to understand his ENUS as irrevocable 
and the only way for him to be. The effort that I take to be required in being true to 
oneself is one of truthful and accurate assertion and expression of the ENUS. Inherent 
in this effort, I take it, is that one needs to express one’s ENUS unreservedly, as well 
as wholeheartedly take on social costs, social benefits and demands that the 
assertion of one’s ENUS requires.  
 
A quintessential characteristic of human life that will help me best articulate the effort 
required in assertion and expression of who one is, is the fact that individuals form 
an understanding of who they are in an already existing social tapestry. This social 
tapestry is made up of human categories (or identities) that make up all the possible 
ways for one to be that one can occupy in order to assert themselves as a person 
with the said identity. When we think of the constitutive facts that make up who we 
are, we often have these kinds of categories in mind. We think of ourselves as fathers, 
brothers, queer people and men, amongst other human categories. We also often 
take these aspects of our identities to be irrevocable aspects of who we are, such 
that we are not who we are without them. To articulate the implications of there being 
human categories that we come to assume as reflective of who we are, I want to make 
reference to Ron Mallon’s (2016) account of human social categories in his book, The 
Construction of Human Kinds. Taking it for granted that his account of social roles is 
the correct one amongst its alternatives, I want to make use of it in a rudimentary way 
that does not require us to be committed to much of Mallon’s own claims. While his 
work focuses more on providing a generalizable account of the construction of human 
categories, I am more interested in the conditions Mallon sets as being required for 
the constitution of social categories. He states that social categories are constituted 
under the following two conditions: 
 
a. “Where the representations (i.e. the labelling of people, the necessary 
characteristics that certain people are said to have, evaluations associated 
with the certain type of person, the social costs and benefits associated with 
being a said person picked out and the expectations of behaviour when 
interacting with the people being picked out) is linked to a set of beliefs and 
evaluations – or ideas about the persons being picked out” (Mallon, 2016:58).  
b. “That for all persons in the community, everyone knows that everyone knows 
that everyone knows that (a) occurs and believe it to hold. That is, it is common 
knowledge that the representations pick out people of a certain category 
obtain in the community of those people in that said category” (Mallon, 
2016:58).  
 
Without committing myself to further aspects of Mallon’s constructionist theory of 
social roles, there is a key take away that relates to our understanding of the social 
roles or sub-identities that we come to assert as parts of who we are in our ENUS. We 
can see that who we take ourselves to be can be seen to largely draw from already 
existing and relatively adequate socially defined possibilities which are granted by 
the various existing social roles and by what we generally know about them. All in all, 
these social roles each have their respective descriptions, social costs and benefits, 
behaviours and demands which are adequately recognized as being associated with 
having that identity in question. For you to be a person who assumes a said identity 
as your own, a significant aspect of being able to consider yourself as a person of 
that identity will depend on your adequate acquisition and affirmation of the 
characteristics that make one a quintessential person with that said identity. To avoid 
the possible perception that I am advocating for conformity when authenticity is 
ordinarily understood to be about the uniqueness of persons, I want to qualify my 
claims here. I take it that one’s individualized articulation of a particular social 
category, which will in large part be shaped by the complexity of one’s explanatory 
tale that is wholly unique to that individual, should be able to capture what it is to be 
a person with that identity. So, in one’s differentiable articulation of self as a person 
with a said identity, one must nonetheless show adequate articulation of the aspects 
generally taken to be markers of that identity, such that one can satisfy the criterion 
of belonging to that identity.  
 
Given this, I think that I am now better positioned to explain the effort required in 
acting and behaving in a way that can undoubtedly reflect the story of who one is. An 
individual’s ENUS has as its components constitutive elements that are connected 
coherently into a story of who they are. Taking one aspect of an individual’s life, if the 
truthful ENUS involves Themba being a gay man, then Themba has to do the following 
to be true to being a gay man. Themba will firstly have to evaluate for himself what 
being gay entails, making adequate reference to the representations of being a gay 
man that have been established and are common knowledge in picking out an 
individual as belonging to the “gay community.” In looking into what being gay entails, 
Themba will be able to see the modes of behaviour and actions that being gay 
necessitates. Also, he would have to evaluate the judgments of people who are gay, 
the social costs and benefits that are associated with being gay. After this process of 
reflection, Themba would then have to adequately assume these representations of 
being a gay man in his own individuated way. To do so is not always easy of course, 
especially with persecuted identities like homosexuality. I take it as adequate for an 
individual to get to the point of adequate self-acceptance regarding what it entails to 
be a person with a said identity. In the expression of this identity, one can still 
articulate a said social identity in a way that feels most reflective of their individuality- 
without discounting the fact that to be a person of x identity is to behave, act and take 
on demands which we can generally take to be associated with the identity.  
 
I think queer identity is interesting in cases where we are considering the nexus 
between being true to oneself and the expression of one’s identity. Much of the 
immediate concern might relate to whether Themba has to tell others that he is gay 
to be true to himself and be seen as expressing himself truthfully. The position to take 
would be to say that he has to express himself to himself and others as a gay person 
to be considered authentic. However, I want to state my reservations that treat 
authenticity as a form of moral supererogation that goes against common sense 
considerations such as one’s safety and survival. It is a very significant reality that 
individuals like Themba live in very homophobic communities where their public 
expression of their homosexuality can put their lives in direct danger. However, I take 
this to be illuminating of the nature of the moral judgments we make about 
authenticity. I contend that Themba’s failing to express himself as a gay person 
without reservation is a failure to be completely true to himself.  
 
However, this reveals two things about the nature of being authentic. Firstly, 
authenticity can be a surprisingly accommodating notion as an ethical ideal. If 
Themba was to accept that he is gay and live his private life as a gay man, we can 
consider him to have gotten as close as possible to being his true self, given the 
circumstances that obstruct him from being fully true to himself. Here, we can take 
Themba to be closer to being authentic than he would otherwise be by choosing to 
suppress and ignore his sexuality. We would also understand that he would need to 
express himself without reservation in order to be fully authentic. Secondly, this 
reveals that we may be wrong in our moral judgments about authenticity. Here, we 
also need not necessarily take a failure to be authentic as a moral failure on the part 
of that individual. We can see that there can be obstructions to being authentic that 
are genuinely beyond an individual’s control without having to compromise on 
authenticity as an ethical ideal, as well. An individual who is choosing not to assert a 
persecuted identity like homosexuality, having weighed it against considerations like 
a genuine threat to their life, for example, need not be seen as a bad person because 
they are not authentic. Within the set of possibilities available to Themba as to how to 
assert himself in a way that reflects his gay identity, we can consider him to be truer 
to himself without taking him to be as true to himself as he could irrevocably be. As 
such, being true to your ENUS requires you to assert and express your identity(ies) 
and its demands to yourself and others as well.  
 
 
Moving on to the related effort required, one needs to also put the effort of 
consistency in adequately expressing their ENUS, such that the expression of one’s 
ENUS can be seen to reinforce the stability of one’s ENUS over time. Someone who 
is true to who they are in this case also reliably acts and behaves in a way that reflects 
their ENUS. Being authentic is a state of self that requires the establishment of stability 
in the self. An individual who undergoes erratic changes in behaviour or acts in a way 
that cannot be comprehended as a function of who he is cannot be understood as a 
person who is being true to who he is. This makes reference to one’s continued action 
and behaviour adequately and consistently reflecting the intention of expressing 
one’s ENUS. Put simply, in order to be taken as being true to oneself, the motivation 
for why you do what you do or why you behave the way you do should be the fact 
that it reflects who you take yourself to be. 
 
 One therefore needs to adequately display a wholehearted and unreserved 
commitment to who they are, which is best reflected in the projects that they decide 
to take on. For example, we take it that one who is being true to who one is  as a 
mother has taken on the commitment of raising her children wholeheartedly, such 
that she is seen as a good mother. For her to consistently forget her children at school 
or fail to care for her children when they need affection is to not be true to who she is 
as a mother. We see that in this case, the reliability of one’s ENUS over time is also 
based on how excellently one comes to assert and express aspects of one’s identity. 
Here, behaving in a way that reinforces the indubitability of one’s story of who one is, 
is to be true to who one is as well.  
 
4.3  A Predisposition to Maintaining the Alternativelessness of Your ENUS, in the 
Face of Change 
 
In this final section, I articulate the fact that one’s ENUS should be resistant to threats 
of destabilization. Part of whether one is being true to oneself will also be evident in 
how one adequately continues to maintain one’s ENUS as a representation of who 
one is- despite changes that threaten to destabilize the conception of who one 
currently sees oneself as being and possibly ever being. This point about being true 
to oneself is particularly related to the extrapolated nature of the self. A representation 
of an ENUS as a true personal story needs to be relatively stable, and this includes 
being stable in relation to one’s vision for oneself. If MacIntyre and I are right to 
construe the self as a unity that is brought about by living in a way that actualizes 
their vision for a good life, then it is imperative that this also be a component of the 
self that remains relatively stable in the face of changes that may come about in 
future. However, I also stated that the notion ENUS also accommodates the idea that 
one can change their telos and still be considered to have an ENUS that is a true 
representation of who they are. So, the question arises: How can one be true to who 
one is now when one can come to change and have a new ENUS that is formed by a 
change in one’s vision for a good life. This question arises particularly because the 
credibility of one being true to who they are is predicated in how they are able to 
maintain their ENUS in a relatively stable way in the midst of threats to their current 
conception of the self.  
 
What I take to be needed in this instance are two things. Firstly, it is important to 
establish the type of relationship one has with their ENUS as a story of who they are 
now and ever possibly could be, within the space of existing existential possibilities 
that are conceivably available to them. Secondly, we need to look at the nature of the 
changes that warrant a change into a new ENUS. In the first instance, I want to make 
clarifications between the notion of existential possibilities and the notion of a self. I 
think there is significant ambiguity in our talk of existential possibilities that come to 
complicate our conception of the self unnecessarily. At any given point in a person’s 
life, there are possible ways of being that are available to him. We should note 
particular things about the self in relation to this. The self is all that one can possibly 
be or conceive of themselves as being. It would be unintelligible to think of the self 
as already existing outside of the realm of a life that is conceivable for one to live. 
Simply put, you cannot be what is inconceivable as an option for you to be. In relation 
to the nature of the self as such, I think it reveals the nature of the self in relation to 
existential possibilities, namely that the self is something that can only exist within the 
space of conceivable possibilities for the agent living that life. Given that our future is 
unpredictable, it is likely that it will open us up to new existential possibilities that we 
may want to take on as constitutive elements of who we are. However, we need not 
take this to mean that the self is in a sense incomplete because of this fact. What we 
take it to show, rather, is that the self is all that it can be at all times, until such a point 
that one is opened up to a new existential possibility that demands articulation in 
one’s life story. At that point where one assumes that existential possibility as a 
constitutive element of who they now are, they are all that they can possibly be at that 
point in time too.  
 
Upon considering the abovementioned insights, an individual can be considered to 
be true to who they are when they assert who they are as alternativeless, in the face 
of the conceivable existential possibilities available to them. The alternativelessness 
is established as a function of the efforts already discussed in the first and second 
section, mainly coming from an unwavering commitment to the irrevocability of the 
story of one’s self, given all that one knows they could otherwise possibly be. This 
means that in the face of change, one has to have the willpower to resist discord in 
one’s conception of the self. I think this is something we can think of in terms of the 
extrapolated self, in that as humans, we do not merely live in the moment, but we also 
anticipate. We anticipate what will happen, how we would act in situations where our 
lives change significantly, and so forth. Our ability to anticipate what would happen 
to us, and how we would react, both play a crucial role in how we come to establish 
the ENUS. We, so to speak, work stability into our ENUS by considering how we would 
come to behave in the case of certain occurrences in the future that we might face. 
How does one work stability into one’s ENUS? In aiming to tell a coherent story of all 
that you are and possibly could conceive of yourself as being, you work-in the 
tenacity of who you are as a way of reaffirming the accuracy of the claim that you are 
who you take yourself to be.  
 
Now, a change in one’s telos is a very different kind of change that can occur in one’s 
future. It is the expansion of existential possibilities- an expansion which reveals to 
one a new way to be that is incomparably higher than the way in which one was being 
before, with particular reference to the vision for one’s life that one had been living 
before the expansion of existential possibilities. In this case, for one to be true to 
oneself, one would then need to take the same efforts discussed up until this point 
and apply them to this newly established self. In this situation, the irrevocability of the 
self before the change in telos, primarily predicated by the conceivable existential 
possibilities before the change, is defeated by the irrevocability of the new telos that 
informs the newly established unified self. What we see is that one can be true to who 
one is before and after the change in telos, mostly because in both cases, one is all 
that one is and could possibly be, given the existential possibilities available to one 
that make the notion of a self intelligible in the first place.  
 
Having completed my conceptual analysis of what it is to be true to who one is, I want 
to cast our minds back to the considered judgments about what being true to oneself 
entails. In establishing our considered judgments about what being true to oneself 
entails, I stated that it requires efforts of truthfulness towards oneself. Notably, one 
should strive to accurately embody how they describe themselves, ensuring that who 
they take themselves to be is primarily self-originating without discounting the 
contributions others can make in illuminating who they are to themselves. I discussed 
the composition of one’s story truthfully, the expression of oneself in a way that 
adequately reflects who one takes oneself to be, and the maintenance of self through 
working stability into the self. This discussion aimed at showing how one can 
adequately account for what it is to be true to who one is. Having provided the 
conception of what it is to be true to oneself, I now move to explain why it is we 






































The Good in Authenticity 
 
n this final chapter, I provide an account of why we ordinarily take authenticity to 
be a good thing. It is important to state that I am only committing myself to 
explaining why we generally associate authenticity with goodness. I consider my 
discussion of the ENUS and the effort required for one to be true to oneself to have 
implicitly revealed that we generally associate authenticity with goodness. In making 
this more explicit, I believe Aristotelian Eudaimonic virtue ethics is a good candidate 
for explicating the goodness we associate with being true to oneself. In the first 
section, I claim that we take authenticity to be good because it requires and 
reinforces a characteristically virtuous life for the authentic individual. In the second 
section, I state that we can understand authenticity to be good because it is 
inextricably linked to the possibility and actualization of a Eudaimonic life. It is 
important to note that I am not committed to arguing for the stronger claim that 
authenticity is good because it is a virtuous life and a Eudaimonic life. This is because 
I take defending the stronger claim to be mainly outside of the scope of this 
I 
dissertation. Instead, I take it to be sufficient to explain why whenever we think of 
being true to oneself, we ordinarily also think of being authentic as a good state for 
one to be in.  
 
5.1 Authenticity as Involving and Reinforcing a Virtuous Life  
 
In this first section, I defend the claim that authenticity is generally associated with 
goodness because it involves and reinforces something else that we take to be good. 
It involves and reinforces a virtuous life for the authentic individual. Before proceeding 
to make my argument, let us start by looking at what it is for one to have an Aristotelian 
ethical virtue. In the Nicomachean Ethics (NE, II.6), Aristotle states the following about 
virtue: 
 
“We must, however, not only describe virtue as a state of character but 
also say what sort of state it is. We may remark, then, that every virtue 
or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which it is the 
excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well… if this is 
true of every case, the virtue of man will be the state of character of man 
which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well” 
(NE, II.6).  
 
In particularly picking out what is good about being virtuous, what we see about virtue 
is that it is the excellent state of an individual’s character. Aristotle further explains 
virtue in terms of the doctrine of the mean, as a by-product of an agent’s good use of 
practical reason. What this means is that virtue involves using our practical reasoning 
to make choices on how to act and behave in a way that is “just right” between two 
otherwise vicious ways of acting and behaving in any given situation (NE, II.2). The 
doctrine of the mean dictates that virtue is the intermediate state between otherwise 
deficient or excessive states of character, where either extremity of character is 
considered to be bad for one qua one’s human flourishing and qua one’s individual 
flourishing. Aristotle mentions several character traits as virtuous, including 
truthfulness, courageousness, temperance, and impartiality. For the sake of my 
argument going forward, I will assume that the abovementioned virtues are the most 
important cluster of virtues required for one to live a virtuous life. Having shown what 
virtue is, I want to show how authenticity requires and reinforces a virtuous life. This 
will be done by showing how one cannot be authentic and lack in any of the 
abovementioned key virtues. This will lend credence to my view that authenticity is 
ordinarily taken to be good because it requires and reinforces a virtuous life.  
 
First, my discussion in the previous chapter availed already that one cannot lack 
truthfulness and be true to who they are. We can see how this is the case by showing 
how the motivations of an individual that has a deceitful disposition are starkly 
incompatible with being true to oneself. Someone who is by nature deceitful cannot 
be taken to be swayed by or committed to truthfulness in any substantive sense. I 
stated that being true to oneself requires the effort of making sure that the 
configuration and expression of one’s ENUS adequately and accurately reflects one’s 
explanatory tale and the lived vision for the attainment of one’s telos. Now, if one is 
predisposed to being deceitful, then one would have no reason to ensure that their 
ENUS strives for accuracy, given that striving towards accuracy necessarily involves 
a commitment to truth through adequately accounting for the facts.  
 
At this point, it is essential to refer back to MacIntyre’s (1981:205) idea of the unity of 
a virtue as being established through appeal to who someone is as a whole. 
Considerations about what it is to speak of who someone is as a whole reveal 
something more substantial about the individual’s character and how they live their 
life. Being truthful to who you are as a whole not only means accurately reflecting your 
explanatory tale, but also involves ensuring that all your actions and behaviours 
reflect the explanatory tale and the lived vision you have set for yourself. This requires 
a significant and constant amount of honesty in the individual in how they generally 
carry out their expression of self as well. When looking at how one’s ENUS is also 
affirmed or validated as a truthful tale about a person, we need to also look at a host 
of events, actions and behaviours that we can, on the whole, take to reflect the 
truthfulness of the self that they would need to be true to in order to be authentic. 
Being true to yourself can be affirmed through ensuring that what you do, what you 
say you are going to do and how you behave are reflections of who you are.  If we 
see behaviour and action as constitutive elements of one’s ENUS, we would see that 
being true to one’s ENUS already entails that one is truthful in a relatively consistent 
and widespread way in various areas of one’s life. Therefore, we see that it is 
implausible for one to simultaneously be true to who they are and lack truthfulness in 
character.  
 
Secondly, I also argue that it is implausible for one to be cowardly and be true to who 
they are. Being a coward in the Aristotelian sense refers to a very particular state of 
character. On the spectrum of fear, a coward is an excessively fearful individual. He 
is excessively scared to a point where he is easily scared. He significantly 
undermines his ability to rise to challenges or overcome adversities that he may face 
throughout his life (NE, II.4). There are a few ways in which a coward may not be able 
to meet the demands required for him to be true to himself. In discussing the efforts 
required for a person to be true to himself, we saw that he should make an effort to 
express and maintain his ENUS unreservedly and irrevocably. In the context of 
Aristotle’s understanding of courageousness, this requires an expression of self that 
is reasonably uninhibited. Such an expression of self is significantly undermined 
when one is predisposed to constantly and excessively succumbing to fear. In the 
case where one actually has a particular persecuted identity, an excessive fixation 
with avoiding the social costs of the identity is likely to have an inverse relationship 
with the assertion of the identity in question. It is likelier that one would withhold self-
expression as a means of always “protecting” himself against potential adversity.  
 
Let us remind ourselves of the nature of cowardice versus courage. As Aristotle notes, 
“the courageous man withstands and fears those things which are necessary and on 
account of the right reason, and how and when it is necessary to fear and withstand 
them and likewise in the case of being bold” (NE, 1116b17-19). Given that Aristotelian 
virtuousness is governed by acting in the right way, given the circumstances one is 
in, we can see that being true to oneself requires that one express 
oneselfunreservedly in the right way. It would involve one acting in a way that they 
express themselves unreservedly as they can in a manner most appropriate to the 
circumstances they find themselves in. In the case of Themba, we see that he is not 
necessarily cowardly because he reasonably weighs his circumstances in the 
expression of himself. He is cowardly in the Aristotelian sense because he 
overdetermines the role of avoiding the social costs in fear of being labelled as gay, 
so much so that he overly inhibits self-assertion. This is what leads him to the denial 
of his own sexuality, even to himself. In this way, Themba robs himself of the 
opportunity to be true to himself because his fears excessively end up making him 
narrate out a constitutive element of himself in his ENUS. This leads him to assume a 
fraudulent identity to mask who he really is. Taking this to be contrary to the demands 
of being true to oneself, we can see that one cannot be cowardly in character and be 
true to oneself either.  
 
Concerning impartiality and temperance, we can see why one must be virtuous in 
this way to be true to who one is. This is easily seen in situations where one may be 
tempted to misrepresent who one is or is prone to wishful thinking about who one is 
and possibly can be. The virtuous character traits of impartiality and temperance, in 
this instance, relate largely to maintaining the veracity of one’s ENUS as a reflection 
of one’s life as one has actually lived it. Consider a self-indulgent individual, who may 
perhaps have an excessive desire to appear favourable in the eyes of his peers. 
Likely, how such an individual is motivated in the presentation of himself will easily 
result in him being preoccupied with telling a story about himself that people want to 
hear, as opposed to a story that accurately reflects the life that he has lived. 
Alternatively, take someone who is significantly biased towards his views about who 
he is, and disregards warranted perceptions of others about who he is. I had 
established in the previous chapter that in this case, such an individual would not 
display a proper interest in the veracity of his ENUS. This is given by the fact that a 
person plays significant roles in the stories of others, and hence those people’s 
warranted input in who they think we are should also play a role in forming how we 
conceive of ourselves. What we see is that lacking impartiality and temperance is 
incompatible with being true to who one is. These insights are supported by my claim 
in the previous chapter that being true to oneself presupposes that there is a truthful 
ENUS to speak about in the first place. What my discussion of impartiality and 
temperance show is that these virtues are needed in the establishment of a truthful 
tale that one should be true to in the first place.  
 
Given that we can see that being true to oneself requires the various virtues 
discussed so far, we can see that there is something more significant being revealed 
about the relationship between virtue and authenticity. Being true to who you are can 
be said to require you to live virtuously, in so far as a virtuous life involves one 
displaying the cluster of virtues that I have discussed in this section. What this section 
has displayed is that one cannot be true to themselves and fail to adequately display 
any of the key virtues that I assumed are important for one to live a virtuous life. Not 
only does this show that it is untenable to be authentic and lack in some virtue, it also 
shows that being authentic is not a virtue amongst other virtues but is akin to and 
requires the virtuous life itself. The kind of project that is establishing, expressing and 
maintaining your ENUS shows that it is not enough for one to be erratic and discretely 
episodic in how they behave and act virtuously. The project requires one to display 
virtuousness in a distinctively consistent and global sense in all that one does, say 
and how one behaves throughout all aspects of one’s life.  One way to see this is in 
how virtuousness impacts the establishment and reinforcement of the veracity of 
one’s ENUS that is required for one to be true to oneself in the first place.  
 
There is a potential issue that may stand in the way of conceiving of authenticity as 
requiring one to live virtuously. This issue mainly arises from my development of an 
account of a unified self that stems from MacIntyre’s notion of narrative unity. There 
may be a concern that I have gotten things the wrong way around concerning the 
relationship between virtue and the self. As we saw in MacIntyre’s project in After 
Virtue, the reason for postulating a unified human life was to provide a non-arbitrary 
and complete account of the virtues. This implies that a tenable account of the virtues 
presupposes the unity of a human life. MacIntyre states that “the unity of a virtue in 
someone’s life is intelligible only as a characteristic of a unitary life, a life that can be 
conceived as a unified whole” (Macintyre, 1981:202). As such, my reasoning may 
appear circular, considering that my conception of authenticity requires a unified self 
that seemingly needs the virtues to be established in the first instance.  
 
In response to this potential charge of circularity, I believe that we can embrace that 
there is a virtuously circular relationship between virtuousness and the unified self. 
This will be given by the fact that there is a positive feedback loop between virtue 
and the ENUS. It is sufficiently plausible that when one consistently acts and behaves 
virtuously in configuration and expression of the ENUS, one becomes better 
positioned to assert one’s true self. Being true to oneself, in turn, can stabilize 
attributions of virtue to an individual in a non-arbitrary and complete way. To expand 
on this, what the discussion in this first section was set to illustrate is the fact that 
displaying virtue towards oneself is important in ensuring that one is true to oneself. 
Attributing virtuousness, at least, needs to come after an adequate display of 
virtuousness throughout one’s life.  Alternatively, virtue needs to be displayed 
consistently and globally in all that one does, says and how they behave in order for 
it to be non-arbitrary. The ENUS as that which one is being true to will be constituted 
mainly by how one acts and behaves on the whole as well. We see that being true to 
the constitutive facts of your life story reinforces the stability of attributing certain traits 
to your character. This is because the consistency brought about by the coherence 
in your actions, and behaviours that are taken to be constitutive of who you are, in 
turn reinforce the consistency of the virtues that need the holistic host of actions and 
behaviours to ensure that the virtues are not attributed arbitrarily.   
 
In this section, I hope to have shown that it is tenable to think of being true to oneself 
as requiring one to live virtuously. Hence, this allows us to articulate the goodness in 
being true to oneself in that it involves a distinctively virtuous way for an individual to 
live. This is primarily given by the fact that being true to oneself requires the display 
of a key cluster of virtues. It is also given by how authenticity comes to reinforce the 
stability of these virtues in a person.  
 
5.2. Being True to Who You Are As Generally Inextricably Linked to Living a 
Eudaimonic Life 
 
In this section, I argue that authenticity is generally taken to be good because it is 
inextricably linked to another good, which is living a Eudaimonic life. To support the 
tenability of this claim, I want to challenge an intuition that claims that authenticity 
may be separate from a Eudaimonic life. This intuition is the thought that one can be 
authentic yet fail to be eudaimonic. On immediate observation, we see it as a 
possibility that one can be true to who one is and yet fail to live a good life. This may 
suggest that I am making too strong of a claim about the relationship between 
authenticity and Eudaimonia. What this suggests is that authenticity by itself is 
insufficient for a Eudaimonic life.  
 
To this, it is important to note that I am not necessarily arguing that authenticity is 
sufficient for one to have a good/Eudaimonic life. I am instead defending the claim 
that authenticity is seen as good because it is inextricably linked to a Eudaimonic life. 
What the claim that I defend requires is that I only show how we cannot decouple 
authenticity and a Eudaimonic life. I want to show that being authentic cannot be seen 
to be compatible with not living a good life. This can be seen in how something that 
inhibits a good life will also inhabit one’s ability to be authentic. In addition, being 
authentic in an important sense requires the potential for and actualization of a 
Eudaimonic life in the first instance. What this will show is that we cannot decouple 
the notions of authenticity and a characteristically Eudaimonic life, which will lend 
credence to my view that we associate authenticity with goodness because it is 
inextricably linked to a Eudaimonic way of life.  
  
One thing ordinarily taken to contribute to the failure of one’s ability to live a good life 
is the fact that one might be extremely unlucky. Aristotle, in reference to virtues, 
claims that “one can be as virtuous as they want but cannot live a Eudaimonic life if 
they are terribly unlucky” (Russell, 2012:107). Take an individual who has spent much 
of his formative years living in war-torn Syria and has lost all that he finds valuable 
about life, including his family. This individual lives in fear most of his life and lives 
more to survive than to flourish. In these circumstances, we see that he lives a 
significantly impoverished life and cannot be said to live a good life. Now, it is 
important to note how this discord and misfortune in his life also makes it highly 
improbable that he would be in a position where he can be authentic either.  
 
On the level of configuring one’s personal narrative, we saw in the first chapter that a 
person’s narrative is nested in already existing narratives of the context in which they 
find themselves and interlocks with the narratives of others. Being able to compose 
a personal narrative that is adequately coherent and intelligible would necessarily 
have to occur in a background that is adequately intelligible and coherent as well. 
We see that in the state of significant discord in the background story of one’s life, it 
becomes significantly difficult to narrate about one’s self coherently. If someone lives 
in a constantly chaotic and discordant background, it is difficult for them to form an 
ordered narrative of themselves. Also, it is significantly unlikely that someone primarily 
concerned with their day to day survival would be able to carry out a lived vision in 
any significant way. It would be tough for such a person to actively live in pursuit of 
their telos, which would mean that they would struggle in bringing about the unity that 
is required for one to have an ENUS that they are going to be true to. What we see is 
that misfortune and discord do not only stand in the way of a good life but also stand 
in the way of one’s ability to conceive of a coherent, unified self. Given that we need 
the ENUS as the self that we are true to, it seems that without being able to establish 
it adequately, it would be challenging (if not impossible) for one to be true to who they 
are in the first place. What this should lend credence to is the idea that the failure to 
live a good life will significantly correspond with a failure to be authentic- where both 
failures are brought about by the same cause. Conversely, this can be taken as one 
way to illustrate that being true to yourself is inextricably linked to living a Eudaimonic 
life.  
 
Another way of consolidating authenticity’s inextricable link to a Eudaimonic life is to 
focus again on the nature of the ENUS that one needs to be true to. Casting our minds 
back to Chapter 3, I stated that the ENUS is the narrative of self that comprises all 
that one is, and all that one can possibly conceive of themselves as being. All that 
one can possibly conceive of themselves as being is captured by the notion of a lived 
vision. I stated how the unity is brought about by how they actively pursue their telos 
in the middle of living their life. A component of being true to yourself will involve the 
efforts required in how one actualizes their telos and has moved to actualize their 
telos up until the current moment. Two things are involved in actualizing one’s telos 
that are required for one to have an ENUS. First, one must be able to conceive of their 
telos as attainable in the first instance. Second, we see that one must be able to live 
in a way that is conducive to attaining one's telos.  
 
 As such, one must be able to and must be working towards realizing their telos to 
establish the unity of self that is the ENUS. Notably, MacIntyre tells us something quite 
important: “The good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man” 
(MacIntyre, 1981:219). This reveals something quite important about the 
establishment of the unified self that has a bearing on whether we take an authentic 
life to bring about an Eudaimonic life. We see that a significant part of establishing 
one’s ENUS is to live a Eudaimonic way of life. A Eudaimonic way of life, as we see, 
is a life that is spent in the pursuit of one’s telos. A Eudaimonic way of life, taking from 
MacIntyre’s insights about the good life, is in an important sense internal to the 
establishment of one’s ENUS in the first place. What is revealed are two important 
insights. Firstly, there is a sense in which one must be capable of and actively pursue 
Eudaimonia to have a self to be true to. Secondly, the amount of effort one puts into 
being true to who one is can be said to dictate how successful one can be in their 
pursuit of a good life. The effort to be true to oneself involves your commitment to 
realize your telos. Additionally, the effort marks the extent to which your life as you 
live it now is a life that adequately reflects the vision that you have set for yourself. If 
you are true to yourself, we can therefore say that you would have adequately lived a 
particular kind of life that is Eudaimonic. This will be because you have lived a good 
life in virtue of your efforts of realizing a good life.  
 
What is revealed is that we can take authenticity to be good because it is inextricably 
linked to a Eudaimonic way of life. This is the case, such that not to be true to oneself 
is to not live a Eudaimonic life. Put differently, it is implausible for one to have the 
ability to be authentic and fail to live a Eudaimonic way of life. We see this in how 
reasons that may inhibit one from living a Eudaimonic life also inhibit one’s ability to 
be true to one’s self. I also showed how being authentic can be vital in ensuring the 
successful realization of a Eudaimonic life. These two insights, coupled with the 
insight that authenticity requires and reinforces the virtues, can be used in providing 













































The project of this dissertation was mainly aimed at bringing about a conception of 
authenticity that can achieve reflective equilibrium with our considered judgments 
about what authenticity is. I established that “being true to oneself” is primarily widely 
accepted as the ordinary conception of what it means for one to be authentic. I also 
stated that we ordinarily think of authenticity as a good thing. In the first chapter, I 
worked to show how this ordinary conception of authenticity may be initially tenable. 
This was to ensure that the ordinary understandings of authenticity that I use in my 
conceptualization of authenticity were well-founded, as a means of ensuring that the 
conception of authenticity that results from the procedure of reflective equilibrium is 
robust from the beginning. I stated that to be able to provide an adequate conception 
of authenticity, we need to be able to account for what “being true to oneself is” and 
why this is a good thing. To account for this, I stated that an adequate account of 
authenticity must be able to answer the following three aspects of what it is to be 
authentic. First, the account must be able to explain what it is that one is being true 
to. Second, it must be able to explain what being true to oneself entails. Lastly, it must 
be able to explain why we ordinarily think of authenticity as a good thing.  
 
I dedicated the second and third chapters to providing an adequate account of what 
it is to be true to oneself. To do so, I started by looking at MacIntyre’s notion of a 
narrative unity of self as a potential candidate for the self that one is being true to 
when one is authentic. However, in assessing Bernard Williams’ scepticism about the 
narrative unity of self, it became apparent that there were issues with regard to the 
temporarily of the self and the understanding the self as a unity that MacIntyre could 
not adequately account for. Seeing that my project is primarily interested in being 
able to tell us how one can be authentic in the middle of their lives, Williams’ 
scepticism threatened the cogency of using a unified self in telling us how one can 
be authentic now. This was brought about by Williams’ view that it is impossible to 
conceive of a self as a unity in the first place.  
 
In my development of the Extrapolated Unity of Self (ENUS) through making 
modifications to MacIntyre’s notion of narrative unity, I moved to reinforce the 
tenability of thinking of a self as a unity at every given moment in one’s life. The ENUS 
is meant to be an adequate account of how we can take a person as being connected 
to their past, present, and future in the middle of their life. More particularly, I worked 
to show why it is intelligible to think of a self as a unity in the middle of one’s life. 
Having done so, I have also shown that the Extrapolated Unity of Self is the self we 
take one to be true to when we think of one as being authentic in the middle of their 
lives. Having provided an account of the self that one is being true to, I moved to 
account for what being true to oneself entails. In the fourth chapter, I discussed that 
being true to oneself involves the effort that one puts into configuring, expressing, 
and maintaining the self.  
 
Putting in the effort to ensure that your ENUS accurately reflects your explanatory 
tale, ensuring that you unreservedly express yourself and being committed to 
maintaining the alternativelessness of your ENUS were identified as the key. ways 
one can ensure that one is true to oneself. In the last chapter, I discussed the two 
main reasons why we might take authenticity to be good. In the first instance, I 
provided an account of how authenticity is good because it involves and reinforces 
a virtuous life. Secondly, I showed that we can think of being authentic as good 
because of how it is inextricably linked to living a Eudaimonic way of life. Having 
provided adequate accounts of what it is to be true to oneself and why authenticity is 
good, I hope to have provided a tenable and promising account of authenticity that 
achieves reflective equilibrium with our considered judgments about what 
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